*1 This matter is before this court on two discovery disputes between the parties. First, Plaintiff Nancy Rosen seeks testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) regarding the handling of her claim pursuant to two separate components of an insurance policy issued by Defendant Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Nationwide”). Nationwide resists presenting a witness to testify as to one of the coverages. Second, Nationwide seeks documents and deposition testimony from Plaintiff regarding her medical records and treatment that were not available to Nationwide at the time it made its coverage determination. The undersigned Magistrate Judge considers the disputes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(1)(A); see also Orders Referring Case, ECF Nos. 14, 70.

For the reasons that follow, the court respectfully concludes that a portion of the Rule 30(b)(6) testimony Plaintiff seeks, narrowly circumscribed in the manner articulated below, is both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. The court further concludes that Nationwide is not entitled to discovery concerning information about Plaintiff's medical condition, records, and treatment that was not in its possession when it made its determination concerning uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in January 2022.

Plaintiff brings two causes of action against Nationwide: one for unreasonable delay of payments under Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 10-3-1115 and 1116, and the other for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing “in reviewing, adjusting and settling [Plaintiff's Uninsured Motorist] claims.” Amended Complaint, ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 104-112.

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident in November 2020 while she was insured by Nationwide. Id. ¶¶ 7, 31. The insurance policy at issue, which covered the period from February 3, 2020, to January 31, 2021 (the “Policy”), provided $100,000 in underinsured and uninsured motorist (collectively, “UM”) coverage and $5,000 in medical payments, or “MedPay,” coverage. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. UM coverage “insures the policyholder for injuries caused by a third-party driver without sufficient insurance to cover the policyholder's injury.” McCracken v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 896 F.3d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat § 10-4-609(1)(a), (4)). The Colorado “MedPay” statute, by contrast, “requires that all automobile insurance policies issued in Colorado provide at least $5,000 of coverage ‘for medical payments ... for bodily injury, sickness, or disease resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of [a] motor vehicle.’ ” Allen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 907 F.3d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-635(1)(a)); see also Budnella v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., No. 20-cv-00944-KMT, 2021 WL 288763, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2021) (“Medical Payments insurance is generally intended to finance immediate payments to medical responders, who are providing care to persons suffering automobile accident-related trauma and injury, without regard to fault.”) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-635(2)(a)). “In short, the MedPay statute sets up a regime under which Colorado car insurance policies are required to finance a minimum of $5,000 in payments to medical providers[.]” Allen, 907 F.3d at 1237 (emphasis added).

*2 On January 19, 2022, Nationwide “determined Ms. Rosen was entitled to the $100,000 in UM benefits under her policy.” Am. Compl. ¶ 83. Plaintiff contends that “[h]ad Nationwide done a proper investigation into [her] UM claim, it would have determined she was entitled to the $100,000 in UM benefits under her policy sooner than January 19, 2022.” Id. ¶ 84. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, because the adjuster handling the MedPay component of her claim had in their possession documents that triggered payment under MedPay as early as March 3, 2021, id. ¶ 83, Nationwide therefore also had sufficient information to issue payment on Plaintiff's UM claim many months before January 2022. Id. ¶ 65; see also Plaintiff's 7/13/2023 Discovery Brief at 2. Plaintiff therefore seeks deposition testimony from a Nationwide Rule 30(b)(6) representative concerning both its UM and MedPay claims-handling processes. Plaintiff's 7/13/2023 Discovery Brief at 2-3. Nationwide opposes, asserting that the MedPay portion of the Policy's coverage is not at issue in this litigation and is irrelevant to the dispute because “Plaintiff filed suit against Nationwide for alleged bad faith and unreasonable delay in payment of only her UM claim.” Defendant's 7/13/2023 Discovery Brief at 2 (emphasis in original).

For Nationwide's part, it urges the court to compel responses to five interrogatories and three requests for production which generally seek information concerning Plaintiff's “physical, mental, and emotional injur[ies] or condition[s].” See Defendant's 9/11/2023 Discovery Brief at 6-9 (discovery requests). Nationwide also desires to depose Plaintiff “without limitation” on these topics. Id. at 9-10. Nationwide contends that it needs information concerning Plaintiff's “baseline” medical condition to allow it to “(1) understand the nature of Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit, and (2) determine Plaintiff's compliance with conditions precedent to coverage in the policy, such as Plaintiff's duty to cooperate and not misrepresent material facts.” Id. at 3-5. Nationwide asserts that it “should not be held to decisions it made if it was not provided with all relevant information and had no information to call into question whether counsel was providing all relevant medical records, which goes to cooperation required under the policy and the reciprocal duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff opposes such discovery under Schultz v. Geico Casualty Co., in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of an insurer's coverage decision “must be evaluated based on the evidence before it when it made its coverage decision.” 429 P.3d 844, 846 (Colo. 2018) (emphasis added).

The court addresses both disputes in turn.

Rule 30(b)(6) governs the procedures for deposing a corporate party. The notice of deposition must “describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Id. This requirement seeks “to enable the responding organization to identify the person who is best situated to answer questions about the matter, or to make sure that the person selected to testify is able to respond regarding that matter.” 8A C. Wright, A. Miller, & R. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2103 (3d ed. 2010). Accordingly, Rule 30(b)(6) creates obligations on both sides: the side being deposed has an obligation to prepare one or more witnesses to testify, and the side taking the deposition has an obligation to “designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute.” E.E.O.C. v. Thorman & Wright Corp., 243 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2007). “An overbroad Rule 30(b)(6) notice subjects the noticed party to an impossible task. To avoid liability, the noticed party must designate persons knowledgeable in the areas of inquiry listed in the notice.” Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000). Where the deponent “cannot identify the outer limits of the areas of inquiry noticed, compliant designation is not feasible.” Id.

The proper scope of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is also limited by the relevance and proportionality standards of Rule 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is “broadly construed” in relation to discovery, and a request is considered relevant “if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant[.]” Stanton v. Encompass Indem. Co., No. 12-cv-00801-PAB-KLM, 2013 WL 2423094, at *2 (D. Colo. June 4, 2013) (quoting Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005)); Brackett v. Walmart Inc., No. 20-cv-01304-KLM, 2021 WL 1749975, at *3 (D. Colo. May 4, 2021) (“[R]elevance is not so narrowly construed as to limit a story to its final chapter, and neither party is entitled to make it impossible for all meaningful parts of the story to be told.”). “[T]he party resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under [Rule 26], or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Colo. 2004) (quotation omitted).

*3 In considering proportionality, this court “weighs the importance of the discovery to the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Carlson v. Colo. Ctr. for Reprod. Med., LLC, 341 F.R.D. 266, 274 (D. Colo. 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendments make clear that the party seeking discovery does not bear the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations. Advisory Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

“[D]iscovery rulings are within the broad discretion of the trial court, and [the Tenth Circuit] will not disturb them absent a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Kenno v. Colo. Governor's Off. of Info. Tech., Nos. 21-1353 & 21-1434, 2023 WL 2967692, at *7 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1386 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also S.E.C. v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd., 600 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2010) (discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to limit discovery on motion or on its own if it determines: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or may be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (3) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

I. Plaintiff's Request for Testimony Under Rule 30(b)(6)

The disputed topics. At the discovery hearing, Nationwide clarified that it objects to eight topics in Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) Notice, insofar as those topics seek information concerning the claims-handling process of the MedPay component of Plaintiff's coverage.[1] As Nationwide noted, Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit do not allege errors or delay in the MedPay process, but Plaintiff asserts that her impetus for seeking Rule 30(b)(6) testimony about the MedPay component of her claim is to uncover evidence to demonstrate that Nationwide had sufficient information to show that her claim was covered under the UM component of her Policy months before Nationwide paid the full $100,000 limit in January 2022. 7/18/2023 Hr'g Tr. 3:25:40-3:26:05 (“Nationwide had possession of certain medical records and bills at certain times. We don't state that the UM adjuster had it or the MedPay adjuster had it because that's not the big picture here. What is being alleged is that Nationwide had it.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that she needs discovery pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) to show that Nationwide was required to pay out her UM benefits sooner—presumably, at the point in time when it decided it had sufficient information to pay the MedPay benefits. Plaintiff's position is that the knowledge of the MedPay claims-handler can be attributed to Nationwide generally and the UM claims-handler in particular. Id. 3:26:56-3:27:22 (“[T]he MedPay adjuster had some documentation ... which triggered that MedPay adjuster to issue MedPay benefits. Nationwide had those [documents]. That's why they paid the MedPay benefits. The UM adjuster never got triggered to pay the UM benefits even though Nationwide as a whole had the documents.”).

*4 As further support for her assertion that Nationwide should have known that the UM benefits were due much earlier than they were paid, Plaintiff contends that the same claims adjuster handled both her UM and MedPay claims, Pl.’s 7/25/2023 Discovery Brief at 4. Put simply, Plaintiff believes there is no bright-line separation between Plaintiff's MedPay and UM claims-handling processes and, therefore, no difference in what was known to Nationwide during the two processes, and when. Hence, Plaintiff requests Rule 30(b)(6) testimony addressing the MedPay claims-handling process.

Nationwide disagrees. To begin, Nationwide provides sworn testimony contradicting Plaintiff's contention that the same claims specialist handled both the MedPay and UM claims processes for Plaintiff. Def.’s 8/1/2023 Discovery Brief at 3-4 (discussing testimony from Dayna Snyder, the UM claims specialist who handled Plaintiff's UM claim, stating that she does not handle MedPay claims in general and did not handle Plaintiff's MedPay claim specifically). This uncontradicted testimony finds additional support in an email correspondence from Ms. Snyder to Plaintiff advising that an adjuster named Aaron Lucore was assigned to conduct the MedPay coverage assessment, and that “Aaron and I do not share information unless you give us permission to do so.” 12/7/2020 Email from Snyder to Plaintiff (emphasis added). Nationwide further counters that Plaintiff raises no claim or allegation in this lawsuit about any defect in the payment of her MedPay claim, Defendant's 7/13/2023 Discovery Brief at 3-4; that the MedPay evaluation is a separate process governed by different policy language and determined “by a different means, through separate departments,” id. at 5; and that separate Colorado statutes address coverages for MedPay and UM claims, id. at 6.

The Rule 30(b)(6) inquiry authorized by the court. The court concludes that limited Rule 30(b)(6) testimony concerning the handling of Plaintiff's MedPay claim, cabined in the manner described below, satisfies both the relevance and proportionality standards of Rule 26(b)(1).

First, bearing in mind the expansive standard that discovery is relevant if there is “any possibility” that the information sought may be relevant, Stanton, 2013 WL 2423094, at *2, the court finds the critical question here is whether any information came into the hands of the UM adjuster via the MedPay process and, if so, when the UM adjuster received that information. Plaintiff seems to contend that there was such information-sharing early in the claims-adjustment processes and, indeed, goes so far as to assert that the same adjuster handled both the UM and MedPay analyses. Nationwide has presented evidence giving this court reason to doubt that the same adjuster handled both the MedPay and UM components or, if there were two adjusters, that any information was shared between them. Nevertheless, at this stage of the proceedings, and given the nature of Plaintiff's specific contentions, the court declines to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining any discovery on a point which may yield information relevant to the question of whether Nationwide unreasonably withheld UM benefits after the UM adjuster received sufficient documentation to support Plaintiff's claim for coverage.

Second, with regard to proportionality, Nationwide generally argues that, there being no dispute about MedPay in this case, it is necessarily disproportional for it to be compelled to provide discovery about its MedPay analysis. Nationwide particularly resists the idea that it should be obliged to “prepare a separate deponent to present testimony” regarding payment of Plaintiff's MedPay coverage. Defendant's 7/13/2023 Discovery Brief at 3. But if that is necessary, that situation is hardly unusual and is expressly contemplated by the Rule, which provides that “[t]he named organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf[.]” Rule 30(b)(6) (emphasis added). As one judge on this court has put it, “when multiple types and sources of information are sought in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, as is frequently the case, numerous deponents are regularly designated because the information sought is not within the knowledge or grasp of a single individual.” In re Rembrandt Tech., No. 09-cv-00691-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL 1258761, at *14 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009). The court discerns no undue burden in the fact that Nationwide may have to designate and prepare a second witness.

*5 With these principles in mind, the court has reviewed each disputed deposition topic and finds as follows: First, the court concludes that testimony about how Nationwide evaluated Plaintiff's MedPay claim, and how it reached its decision concerning payment of that claim, is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of the case. Therefore, Nationwide is not required to prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on Topics 3, 4, 6, and 15, insofar as those topics request information about Nationwide's analysis of Plaintiff's MedPay claim. Second, the court finds similarly irrelevant and disproportionate here any testimony concerning policies generally governing the evaluation and payment of MedPay claims. Therefore, Nationwide is not required to prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on Topics 8, 12, and 19, insofar as those topics request information about Nationwide's policies, procedures, protocols, and guidelines for handling MedPay claims. The broad information sought in each of the foregoing seven topics is far removed from the sole MedPay-related issue of relevance in a case challenging the timing of the payment of Plaintiff's UM benefits: what the UM adjuster knew, and when she knew it. Evidence concerning intricacies of the analysis leading to the decision regarding Plaintiff's MedPay claim, and policies and procedures regulating MedPay claims generally, have no bearing on this narrow question.

This leads the court to its third finding: to the extent Topic 5—“Nationwide's internal communications regarding Plaintiff's claim for payment of first party benefits”—is construed to seek information concerning internal communications between the MedPay adjuster (or any Nationwide personnel involved in the evaluation of Plaintiff's MedPay claim) and the UM adjuster (or any Nationwide personnel involved in the evaluation of Plaintiff's UM claim), Nationwide is ordered to prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on Topic 5. While the court's role is not to approve each and every question that may be encompassed within this topic, the court anticipates that questions properly within the scope of Topic 5 would concern all communications between the UM and MedPay sides of Nationwide concerning Plaintiff's claims, including specific information about the parties to the communications; the dates of those communications; the information conveyed in those communications; and any documents identified or disseminated in connection with those communications. The court respectfully cautions both sides to take a reasoned approach in asking, and preparing the witness to answer, all questions reasonably associated with Topic 5, and to work collaboratively to obtain responses to all such questions—even if that means pausing the deposition to run to ground properly responsive information.

In closing, the court emphasizes that its approval of narrow discovery in this unique context should not be construed as its countenancing the proposition that discovery concerning an insurer's MedPay analysis will be relevant and proportional in every case that raises only a UM claim. In that regard, the court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff's argument that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fisher, 418 P.3d 501 (Colo. 2018), mandates discovery concerning the MedPay claim here. In Fisher, the Colorado Supreme Court held that an insurer had a duty “not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of covered benefits, even though other components of an insured's claim may still be reasonably in dispute,” under Colorado's uninsured motorist statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115. Id. at 506. Only UM/UIM coverage was at issue in Fisher; no MedPay claim was raised in that case. As Chief Judge Brimmer observed in a recent decision, “MedPay provides ‘overlapping, but not duplicative coverage’ ” to UM coverage, and the payment of MedPay benefits on behalf of a plaintiff does not mean that an insurer “must make a Fisher payment matching the MedPay amount when [a plaintiff's] medical costs are otherwise disputed.” Iwaskow v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 21-cv-00005-PAB-SBP, 2023 WL 6376712, at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2023). Nor does it mean that a plaintiff is necessarily entitled to discovery about an insurer's MedPay analysis in a case challenging only a delay of UM payments. Like the court in Iwaskow, this court rejects the theory that MedPay payments are somehow “an admission of UIM coverage.” Id.

*6 To sum up, Nationwide is directed to prepare and produce a witness for deposition pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) a witness to testify on Topic 5, as delineated above. Plaintiff's additional requests for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony regarding MedPay coverage are denied.

II. Nationwide's Requests for Plaintiff's Medical History

Nationwide seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to five interrogatories and three requests for production of documents, the majority of which demand information about Plaintiff's medical condition, records, and treatment that indisputably was not in Nationwide's possession when it made its determination concerning uninsured motorist coverage in January 2022.[2] Defendant's 9/11/2023 Discovery Brief at 7-9. Nationwide also seeks to depose Plaintiff about this medical information. Plaintiff objects to this discovery. She contends that any medical information and records that were not previously provided to Nationwide are irrelevant to the claims asserted against Nationwide in this action pursuant to Schultz v. Geico Casualty Co., 429 P.3d 844 (Colo. 2018), in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that the insurer's alleged bad faith conduct must be evaluated based on the evidence before it when it made its coverage decision, and that the insurer may not create new evidence to support its earlier coverage decision. Id. at 846 (Colorado Supreme Court “perceive[d] no basis to depart from this well-established principle”); see also Plaintiff's 9/11/2023 Discovery Brief at 2.

*7 After carefully considering these arguments, the court finds that the information Nationwide seeks in Interrogatory Nos. 1 through 5 and Request for Production No. 3 is not relevant to Plaintiff's bad faith claim for the reasons stated in Schultz. However, the court finds that Request for Production No. 2 is relevant and proportional. The court also finds that Request for Production No. 4 is relevant and proportional if limited to information related to Nationwide's UM coverage analysis.

Courts in this District routinely follow Schultz—except in cases where an insured raises a breach of contract claim. Martinez v. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:21-cv-02495-CNS-SKC, 2023 WL 3865717, at *3 (D. Colo. June 7, 2023) (holding that a subpoena from an insurer seeking bank records was not relevant to the plaintiff's bad faith claim under Schultz, but “that the information sought is relevant to the breach of contract claim and Nationwide's related defenses”); Rowell v. Nw. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-00098-PAB-NYW, 2021 WL 5072064, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2021) (recognizing that “the question of reasonableness is not an element of a breach of contract claim,” in holding that “an insurer's failure to seek certain information during the adjustment of a claim does not necessarily form a bar to further discovery once litigation commences for breach of contract”) (collecting cases); Sack v. Colo. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-2580-WJM-NYW, 2021 WL 4991180, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 27, 2021) (holding that a medical report that was not available to the insurer at the time of its decision was “inapposite to the bad faith analysis”), motion to amend denied, 2022 WL 1211583 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2022).[3]

This court, like the Colorado Supreme Court, perceives no reason to depart from the well-established principle recognizing that an insurer's alleged bad faith conduct must be evaluated based on the evidence before it when it made its coverage decision. This court thus declines to permit Nationwide to conduct discovery designed to elicit information that it did not possess during the claim-adjustment process.

The court is unpersuaded by Nationwide's argument that, despite Nationwide's concession of coverage under the Policy, Schultz does not apply here. Nationwide first points to Ayala v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 628 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (D. Colo. 2022), in which Chief Judge Brimmer held that that information provided to the insurer defendant “was incomplete due to plaintiff's failure to cooperate” and that the incomplete information “did not show [at the time the insurer made its decision] that the plaintiff was entitled to additional benefits.” Id. at 1086. Therefore, the court found, Schultz did not apply to bar the insurer's reliance on evidence obtained during the discovery process. Id. In Ayala, however, the record showed that it was clear to the insurer at the time of its decision that the information was incomplete because “Plaintiff did not respond or submit any additional medical records, or disclose any treatment.” See id. at 1084-85. The insurer refused to make any payment under the policy until after litigation was filed. Id. Ayala is therefore distinguishable from this case, where Nationwide is seeking discovery during litigation to prove that Plaintiff withheld medical information that would change Nationwide's coverage determination after Nationwide has conceded coverage and paid the full limits under the Policy.

*8 The court finds the second case cited by Nationwide, Hall v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 40 F.4th 1319 (10th Cir. 2021), similarly distinguishable. In Hall, the insurer defendant also refused to pay any medical benefits because the insured failed to cooperate or to provide any support for his medical expenses. Id. at 1322. While the insurer was still investigating the claim and attempting to obtain such information from the insured, the insured brought suit for breach of contract. Id. Hall makes no mention of Schultz, and rightly so, given that Schultz was inapplicable to the insured's breach of contract claim. By contrast, the court finds that Schultz properly applies here, where Nationwide conceded coverage before the litigation was initiated and Plaintiff only raises causes of action alleging unreasonable delay of payment.

At one of the discovery hearings held in this matter, counsel for Nationwide signaled that, in an eventual answer, Nationwide might raise a counterclaim for fraud, failure to cooperate, or breach of contract against Plaintiff. 9/14/2023 Hr'g Tr. 2:37:28-2:37:40 (counsel for Nationwide stating that the duty to cooperate is an anticipated defense); 2:42:29-2:42:33 (Q: “[A]re we looking at a counterclaim here?” A: “Potentially.”); 2:45:15-2:45:28 (counsel for Nationwide asserting that it could assert a counterclaim for fraud or breach of contract assuming Plaintiff failed to provide all of the necessary medical information). On September 22, 2023, Judge Domenico denied Nationwide's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 75, making Nationwide's answer due October 6, 2023. See Fed. R. Civ. 12(a)(4)(A) (if the court denies a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, “the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action”).

As of the date of this order, Nationwide has not filed an answer or otherwise raised any counterclaims or affirmative defenses in this case, including any counterclaims or defenses sounding in fraud or breach of contract. This court declines to anticipate what discovery might be relevant to any eventual counterclaims or affirmative defenses. At this time, based on the record before the court, the court finds no justification for permitting discovery into Plaintiff's medical condition, treatment, or records in a case focused solely on the alleged bad faith conduct of an insurer.

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that: