*1 On July 5, 2023, plaintiff Nora Gutierrez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Class Action Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court for violations of California's Invasion of Privacy Act, Section 631 of California Penal Code, and Unauthorized Access to Computer Data Act, Section 502(e) of California Penal Code, against defendant Converse, Inc. (“Defendant”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1-2. On August 10, 2023, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal of the instant matter to federal court. Dkt. 1.

On March 4, 2024, the Magistrate Judge granted the parties' request for a Protective Order to address the disclosure and discovery activity of certain confidential, proprietary, or private information. Dkts. 44, 45. On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Application (“Application”) to file under seal “certain documents and [a] portion of the Joint Stipulation submitted as part of [Plaintiff's] concurrently filed Motion to Compel.” Dkt. 61 at 2. On April 15, 2024, Defendant filed a Declaration in Support of the Application to File Under Seal, dkt. 63, and on April 24, 2024, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff's Application to file documents under seal. Dkt. 72.

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed an “Appeal and Request to Reconsider the Magistrate Judge's Decision under Rule 72(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)” regarding the Magistrate Judge's April 24, 2024 Order granting Plaintiff's Application to file documents under seal.[1] Dkt. 80. On May 15, 2024, Defendant filed an Opposition. Dkt. 82. The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge's April 24, 2024 Order is DENIED.

The instant class action arises out of Plaintiff's use of Defendant's “chatbox feature” on Defendant's website, which Plaintiff alleges Defendant did not disclose records and/or eavesdrops on customer conversation without obtaining customer consent. Complaint ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiff alleges Defendant's actions violate California's Invasion of Privacy Act, Section 631 of California Penal Code, and Unauthorized Access to Computer Data Act, Section 502(e) of California Penal Code. Id. ¶¶ 22-27, 28-34.

On February 29, 2024, the parties filed a Stipulated Protective Order, which set out the requirements for the parties' use and disclosure of material designated as “highly confidential.” Dkt 44. On March 4, 2024, the Magistrate Judge granted Defendant's request for a Protective Order. Dkt. 45.

On April 2, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel disclosures and production of documents from Plaintiff. Dkt. 46. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel documents and responses to interrogatories from Defendant. Dkt. 54.

On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Application to file under seal “certain documents and portion of the Joint Stipulation submitted as part of [Plaintiff's] concurrently filed Motion to Compel” and a sealed Declaration in Support of the Application. Dkt. 61 at 2; Dkt. 62. Specifically, Plaintiff sought to file under seal “Exhibits D, F, G, I, and J to the Declaration of Narain Kumar in Support of Plaintiff Nora Gutierrez's Motion to Compel” and “the Joint Stipulation re: Plaintiff Nora Gutierrez's Motion to Compel[.]” Dkts. 61, 62. In Plaintiff's Declaration, Plaintiff explained:

Dkt. 62, Declaration of Narain Kumar (“Kumar Decl.”), ¶ 6.

On April 15, 2024, Defendant filed a Declaration in Support of the Application. Dkt. 63. According to the Declaration of Carolyn Gutsick, “portions of the Joint Stipulation ... and Exhibits D, F, G, I, and J ... contain confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive business information of [Defendant] and, in certain instances, third-parties.” Declaration of Samuel C. Cortina (“Cortina Decl.”), ¶ 4 (citing Dkt. 63-1 Declaration of Carolyn Gutsick (“Gutsick Decl.”), ¶¶ 5-10). “[T]he documents at issue consist of confidential commercial agreements with third-party service providers, internal documents identifying individuals with access to certain technical functionalities, privacy audits requested from third-party service providers, and internal communications assessing those privacy audits.” Id. Defendant “maintains the confidentiality of these records because having this information made public, and thus accessible to [Defendant's] competitors who could develop competing business systems and procedures, could do harm to [Defendant's] business, and may also pose a data security threat.” Id. The Gutsick Declaration describes each document Defendant seeks to keep under seal and the reason justifying keeping each document under seal. See Gutsick Decl. ¶¶ 5-9.

On April 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Declaration. Dkt. 71. That same day, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff's Application by signing Plaintiff's proposed order. Dkt. 72.

On May 2, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order ruling on the parties' motions to compel. Dkt. 74. In the Order, the Magistrate Judge noted with respect to the April 24, 2024 Order and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Declaration, “Plaintiff did not file an opposition until April 24, 2024, at which point the Court had already considered and granted the application to seal.” Dkt. 74 at 2, n.1. The Magistrate Judge thus held “the Court finds Plaintiff's opposition untimely and declines to consider it.” Id. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that “[w]hile the Local Rules do not set a strict time limit for opposing applications to file documents under seal, such applications are akin to other procedural applications filed ex parte,” and oppositions to ex parte applications are to be filed within twenty-four hours. Id. The Magistrate Judge further held that, even if the twenty-four hour deadline did not apply, “Plaintiff's twelve-day delay [in filing the Opposition is] unreasonable, particularly where [Plaintiff] filed the application herself and indicated the parties had already discussed the issue through meet and confer proceedings.” Id. (referencing dkt. 62). Lastly, the Magistrate Judge concluded “Defendant has made the requisite showing to justify the documents being filed under seal.” Id.

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider the Magistrate Judge's decision to grant the Application to seal “because (1) the decision itself fails to make the specific factual findings and legal determinations necessary to seal filed documents, (2) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to grant the Application to Seal, and (3) the [M]agistrate [J]udge improperly declined to consider Plaintiff's timely filed Opposition to the Application to Seal.” Dkt. 80 at 7-8. Plaintiff failed to meet and confer with opposing counsel before filing the instant Motion. Id. at 2.

*3 On May 15, 2024, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Dkt. 82.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district court “may reconsider any pretrial matter ... where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a) (imposing “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law” standard). A finding is considered clearly erroneous only when the Court, reviewing all evidence, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). The clearly erroneous standard is “significantly deferential.” Id. at 623. “By contrast, the contrary to law standard permits independent review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citation and punctuation omitted).

A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS DENIED UNDER LOCAL RULE 7-4 FOR FAILING TO MEET AND CONFER

Under Local Rule 7-4, “[t]he Court may decline to consider a motion unless it meets the requirements of L.R. 7-3 through 7-8.” Local Rule 7-3 requires “[i]n all cases not listed as exempt in L.R. 16-12, and except in connection with discovery motions (which are governed by L.R. 37-1 through 37-4) and applications under F.R.Civ.P. 65 for temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, counsel contemplating the filing of any motion must first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution.”

Here, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reconsider the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Plaintiff's Application to File Under Seal on May 8, 2024 without first meeting-and-conferring with Defense counsel as required by the Local Rules. Dkt. 80 at 2. In addition, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider the Magistrate Judge's Order addressing the application to file under seal does not fall under any of the three recognized exceptions under Local Rule 7-3. While Plaintiff's counsel states they “request[ed] such a conference with [Defense counsel] on Tuesday, May 7, 2024, and received no response,” dkt. 80 at 2, this does not excuse compliance with Local Rule 7-3. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3.

B. EVEN CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER IS DENIED

1. Applicable Law

There is a strong presumption in favor of access to court records, however, an exception has been created for “sealed materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the merits of a case[.]” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2002)). “Under this exception, a party need only satisfy the less exacting ‘good cause’ standard.” Id. “The ‘good cause’ language comes from [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective orders in the discovery process[.]” Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”), a court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). “The protection of trade secrets and other proprietary business information may be good cause to permit the filing of documents under seal.” Corelogic Sols., LLC v. Geospan Corp., No. SACV-20-01500-CJC-KESx, 2020 WL 7786537, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020).

*4 “[W]hen a district court grants a protective order to seal documents during discovery, it already has determined that ‘good cause’ exists to protect this information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[w]hen the protective order ‘was a stipulated order and no party has made a good cause’ showing, then the burden of proof ... remains with the party seeking protection.” In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result” if the document does not remain under seal. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2003). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Industries, Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).

2. Analysis

Here, the Magistrate Judge's Order granting Plaintiff's Application to Seal was not clearly erroneous. Defendant provided specific, particularized reasons for each document it sought to keep under seal. See, e.g., Gutsick Decl., ¶ 5 (Exhibit D is “a commercial agreement containing confidential terms that reflect technical information or services[.] Defendant and the relevant third-party service provider “are subject to their own confidentiality agreements and provisions, which limit their disclosure and limit [Defendant's] ability to use the documents without protecting their confidentiality”); ¶ 6 (Exhibit F is “commercial agreements containing confidential and proprietary terms that reflect technical information or services .... [P]ublic disclosure of this information would enable [Defendant's] competitors to capitalize on its relationships with the third-party service provider to develop competing capabilities and procedures, resulting in competitive injury to [Defendant's] business.”); ¶ 7 (Exhibit G contains “individuals' names and login information (usernames) for [Defendant's] internal business systems and programs, ... the public disclosure of which could compromise [Defendant's] privacy and security to the extent this information may be used to breach [Defendant's] internal systems.”); ¶ 8 (Exhibit I[2] contains internal audits which have “confidential and technical information concerning [Defendant's] and [the third party's] technical and legal processes and procedures related to privacy and security.... “[T]he disclosure of this information could enable [Defendant's] competitors to capitalize on [Defendant's] investment, research and development, and relationships with its service providers to obtain insights and develop competing procedures, resulting in competitive injury to [Defendant].”); ¶ 9 (Exhibit J “contains confidential and technical information concerning [Defendant's] and [the third party's] internal processes and procedures related to privacy and security[.]”).

As Defendant explained, each of these individual documents contains privacy or security information and, if unsealed, would permit competitors to take competitive advantage of Defendant. Cortina Decl. ¶¶ 4-7. Additionally, Defendant asserts “there is no readily apparent less-restrictive means to keep this information confidential” because “all of the information in these exhibits relates to the internal and confidential business or security practices of [Defendant] and/or third parties.” Id. ¶ 5.

In light of the reduced expectation for public access of the non-dispositive, discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case and based on the declarations provided, Defendant has met its burden to make a particularized showing that good cause exists to keep these limited documents under seal for the purpose of addressing Plaintiff's non-dispositive discovery motion to compel. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1135 (holding a “ ‘particularized showing,’ under the ‘good cause’ standard of Rule 26(c) will ‘suffice[ ] to warrant preserving the secrecy of sealed discovery material attached to non-dispositive motions’ ”). Thus, the Magistrate Judge's decision to grant the Application was not clearly erroneous.[3]

*5 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.