*1 Amber Philhower, Medical Air Care, Inc., and HNP Associates, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) initiated this action on December 7, 2023, by filing a Complaint in Orange County Superior Court against Herman N. Philhower, Rachel G. Medel, Andrew J. Shaginaw, Marco A. Galvez, Penn Air Control, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting, among other claims, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (“RICO”). Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint”). Defendant Herman Philhower removed the action to this Court on January 21, 2024, arguing the Complaint arises under federal law due to the RICO claims. Dkt. 1. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 26, “FAC”) asserting claims for declaratory relief, fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, identity theft, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, money had and received, RICO conspiracy, and a substantive RICO claim. On March 22, 2024, Defendants, in three motions, moved to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 30, 32, 34. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Errata, identifying an erroneous date in the FAC and removing two attorneys from the FAC, with a “Corrected Amended Complaint.” Dkt. 56, 56-1. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs separately filed the “Corrected Amended Complaint,” for which a deficiency notice was issued. Dkt. 58, 62.

On June 11, 2024, Defendants Rachel G. Medel, Penn Air Controls, Inc., and Herman N. Philhower (“Moving Defendants”) filed three Motions to Quash Subpoenas served by Plaintiffs upon non-parties Foundation Risk Partners (Dkt. 64), The Western Surety Company (Dkt. 66), and Citibank N.A. (Dkt. 68) (collectively, “Motions”), with three Local Rule 37-2.2 Joint Stipulations (Dkt. 65, 67, 69), evidence from Moving Defendants (Dkt. 64-1, Dkt. 66-1, and Dkt. 68-1) and proposed orders (Dkt. 64-2, Dkt. 66-2, Dkt. 68-2), set for hearing on July 18, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. On June 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the same three Joint Stipulations filed by Moving Defendants the day before, but with declarations and exhibits from Plaintiffs' counsel attached. Dkt. 70, 71, 72. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed three Supplemental Memoranda opposing each of the Motions. Dkt. 73-75. Moving Defendants did not timely file any supplemental memoranda.[1].

The Motions are now fully briefed. The Court finds the Motions may be appropriately decided without oral argument, vacates the hearing, and rules as follows.

*2 “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted).

Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See Rule 26(b)(2); see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). “[I]nformation is ‘relevant’ if it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or any other party, or to the credibility of any witness.” Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence in determining the action more or less probable then it would be without the evidence). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Rule 45(d) provides various bases upon which a person subject to or affected by a federal subpoena may move to quash or limit such subpoena. Generally, “a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.” (quoting Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))); Lee v. Lee, 2020 WL 7890868, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[O]nly the party to which the subpoena is directed has standing to object to the requests on the grounds that they are irrelevant, vague, overbroad, duplicative, unduly burdensome, etc.”). A party therefore generally lacks standing to object a subpoena served on a third party on grounds of relevance or undue burden. See Krenitsky v. Kirsch, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020); Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020). But party who claims a privilege, including a claim of privacy rights, covering the items sought, does have standing to challenge a subpoena served upon a third party. See, e.g., Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 2338713, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2013) (concluding a party has standing to quash a third-party subpoena because the party “asserted a privacy interest in the records sought by the ... subpoena”).

*3 On a timely motion, a court must quash or modify a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception ore waiver applies.” Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Separately, a person from whom discovery is sought may move for an order limiting or forbidding discovery “for good cause” to protect the moving party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Rule 26(c)(1). A party seeking to limit discovery has a “heavy burden” of showing why discovery should be limited. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 436, 437 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). A party resisting discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429); see La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence”). “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).

Although the Motions relate to three different subpoenas directed to three different entities, the parties' respective legal arguments are largely identical in support of and in opposition to the requests for production challenged in each Motions. See Dkt. 65, 67, 69. The Court has carefully reviewed each of the challenged requests and finds that the parties' arguments may properly be addressed collectively, with the two categories set forth below subsuming all substantial objections and arguments raised by Moving Defendants. Separately, Plaintiffs represent that they narrowed certain requests during the meet and confer process. See, e.g., Dkt. 72 at 148 (CM/ECF pagination), ¶¶ 10, 12; Dkt. 72 at 211 (CM/ECF pagination). This Order considers the requests as narrowed.

A. Moving Defendants Objections Based on Overbreadth, Undue Burden, Oppression, Lack of Proportionality, and Relevance are Overruled

In all three Joint Stipulations in support of all three Motions, Moving Defendants assert or reference objections based on overbreadth, undue burden, oppression, lack of proportionality, and lack of relevance as to the challenged requests for production. As noted, in general, “a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All., 299 F.R.D. at 643; see also Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Lee, 2020 WL 7890868, at *5; Krenitsky, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1; Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, at *1. No subpoenaed party filed a motion to quash or timely filed a joinder in the Motions. Moving Defendants lack standing challenge the Subpoenas based on alleged overbreadth, undue burden, lack of proportionality, and even if they had standing to do so, they have not met their evidentiary burden to support such a claim. See McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8; DIRECTV, Inc., 209 F.R.D. at 458. As such, those objections are overruled. As to relevance, considering the low threshold for relevance for discovery purposes, and considering the current state of the pleadings and the wide-ranging nature of the allegations contained in the FAC, spanning decades, the Court finds, assuming Moving Defendants have standing to challenge the relevance of documents sought by subpoenas served on third parties, the requests for production at issue, as narrowed, seek relevant information. Similarly, as to proportionality, based on the information before the Court, including the absence of any evidentiary showing as to any burden or expense that would be incurred in complying with the Subpoenas, the Court, having considered the Rule 26(b) factors, finds the material sought, as narrowed by Plaintiffs, proportional to the needs of the case.

*4 As a result, as to all requests for production challenged in all three Motions, as narrowed by Plaintiff during the meet and confer process, to the extent Moving Defendants seek to quash the Subpoenas based on alleged overbreadth, undue burden, oppression, lack of proportionality, lack of relevance, or similar objections that do not relate to a privilege or privacy, those objections are overruled as to Moving Defendants and the Motions are denied on those grounds.[2]

B. Moving Defendants' Privacy and Confidentiality Objections are Overruled

Moving Defendants assert or reference objections based on financial privacy and/or confidentiality to the requests for production in the Subpoenas challenged in the Motions.

Federal law governs privilege analysis for cases, such as this, where subject matter jurisdiction is based upon the existence of a federal question. See FAC ¶¶ 3, 5-6; Fed. R. Evid. 501; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); Grasshopper House. LLC v. Accelerated Recovery Ctrs., LLC, 2010 WL 11549386, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010) (explaining that because the court has “federal question jurisdiction over this action ... any privacy or privilege determinations are governed by federal [law], rather than by California law.” (internal citation omitted)).

Under federal law, discovery may be restricted because of a party's privacy rights in the information sought by the propounding party. See Curtis Conyers v. Marisa Cano, 2020 WL 7084546, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020) (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.”)). This privacy right is not absolute; rather it is subject to a balancing of needs. A. Farber & Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 191 (citing Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005)); see also Marshall v. Galvanoni, 2019 WL 2491524, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) (“To evaluate whether privacy interests should prevail over the interest in fully discovering a case, the court must balance the party's need for the information against the individual's privacy rights.”). In conducting this balancing test, courts consider the following factors: “(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,” or other public interest favoring access. Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir. 2010).

Thus, even where “objections are raised regarding confidential, private or personal information, ... confidential information may be required to be disclosed after” weighing “the right to discover relevant information ... against the right to privacy” Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 2020 WL 4353687, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); see Carter v. Telecare Corp., 2019 WL 6711688, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (declining to quash subpoena because, in part, “while it is clear that plaintiff has a privacy interest in her employment records, defendant has provided sufficient reason to demonstrate that the requested documents are relevant to the parties' claims or defenses ....”); Bond v. Arrowhead Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2013 WL 12330716, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) (compelling production as “the information sought by plaintiff in the requested documents pursuant to the subpoena is relevant to plaintiff's claims in the pending action” and “plaintiff's need for the discovery outweighs any alleged privacy interest of third parties whose information may be produced.”).

*5 The Court has reviewed each of the challenged requests for production in the three Subpoenas at issue in the Motions and, after balancing Plaintiffs' needs for the information, the nature of the information sought, the nature of action, the relationships between and among the various parties, applicable policy and public interest issues, the potential harm caused by a non-consensual disclosure, and, importantly, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, finds, on balance, disclosure is warranted, subject to the exiting Protective Order (Dkt. 44), as to all categories of records sought. In so finding, the Court notes that Moving Defendants stipulated that good cause supported the issuance of a protective order limiting disclosure of discovery materials in this action, agreeing:

Dkt. 42 (Stipulation) at 2; Dkt. 44 (Protective Order) at 2. While not in and of itself determinative, Moving Defendants' stipulation for entry of a Protective Order for the very types of information sought by the Subpoenas supports a finding that the Protective Order that Moving Defendants requested will provide adequate safeguards here. See A. Farber & Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 191 (finding a plaintiff's need for a defendant's financial documents “outweighs [the defendant's] claim of privacy, especially when the impact of the disclosure of the information can be protected by a carefully drafted protective order”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moving Defendants' privacy and confidentiality objections are overruled.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motions (Dkt. 64, 66, 68) are DENIED.