M.S. v. Angus
M.S. v. Angus
2024 WL 5275581 (C.D. Cal. 2024)
December 4, 2024

Rocconi, Margo A.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Protective Order
Third Party Subpoena
Privacy
Proportionality
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Summary
The plaintiffs served a subpoena for the production of documents related to the defendant's juvenile court and probation files, trial proceedings, and law enforcement documents. The defendants objected, and the parties were unable to resolve the dispute through a meet and confer. The Court must determine whether the subpoena is appropriate and whether it should be quashed, taking into consideration the relevance of the information sought and the burden it may impose on the nonparty.
Additional Decisions
M.S. et al
v.
Oliver Angus et al
Case No. 2:23-cv-09957-MWF-MAR
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed December 04, 2024

Counsel

Olu K. Orange, Orange Law Offices PC, Los Angeles, CA, Dan Stormer, Morgan E. Ricketts, Hadsell Stormer Renick and Dai LLP, Pasadena, CA, for A Minor.
Alexander Faustino Rodriguez, Jenny Chau, Rosa Karim Hirji, Law Office of Hirji and Chau LLP, Culver City, CA, for Oliver Angus, Michael Angus, Jamie Angus.
Jennifer Stone, Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Sophia Brigitte Arim, Bryan Christopher Swaim, Bordin Semmer LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Jenny Chau, Law Offices of Hirji and Chau LLP, Culver City, CA, for Marae Cruce.
Jennifer Stone, Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Sophia Brigitte Arim, Bryan Christopher Swaim, Bordin Semmer LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Gregory Pitts, Antonio Shelton, Jennifer Stone.
Rocconi, Margo A., United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH, DKT. 107

I.
BACKGROUND
*1 Plaintiffs M.S. and I.H. and Defendant O.A. were classmates at Santa Monica High School. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 66 at 2–3. Plaintiffs allege that O.A. physically, emotionally, and sexually abused them both on and off campus. Id. at 2. They allege that the abuse that happened on school grounds should have been prevented by school personnel. Id.
On September 16, 2024, Plaintiffs' counsel served a subpoena for the production of documents direct to “David Slayton, 111 N. Hill Street, Rm 105E, Los Angeles CA 90012”, which sought production of the following documents from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in Los Angeles, CA regarding O.A:
(1) Each document related to and/or containing within O.A.'s Juvenile Court File;
(2) Each document related to and/or containing within O.A.'s Probation File;
(3) Each document from O.A.'s juvenile court hearing(s);
(4) Each exhibit admitted into evidence at O.A.'s juvenile court hearing(s);
(5) Each document related to O.A.'s trial proceedings;
(6) Each document from law enforcement related to O.A.'s juvenile case;
(7) Each document pertaining to O.A.'s arrest;
(8) Each transcript prepared, maintained and/or released by the court related to O.A.'s juvenile proceedings;
(9) Each transcript prepared, maintained and/or released by the probation department related to O.A.'s juvenile proceedings;
(10) Each document constituting or related to contact information for witnesses in O.A.'s juvenile proceedings;
(11) Each document constituting or related to contact information for victims in O.A.'s juvenile proceedings;
(12) Each document constituting or related to contact information for experts in O.A.'s juvenile proceedings;
(13) Each document constituting or related to Judicial Counsel Form JV-690 sent to any school regarding O.A.; and
(14) Each document constituting or related to notice given to any school per California Welfare and Instutitions Code section 827(b) and/or California Education Code section 48267 regarding O.A.
Dkt. 107-1 (“Joint Stip.”) at 2–3.
Pursuant to Local Rules 37-1, before filing motion to quash the subpoena, Defendants' counsel sent Plaintiffs' counsel a meet and confer letter on September 30, 2024. Id. On October 4, 2024, counsel participated in a telephonic meet and confer regarding the aforementioned subpoena; however, the parties were unable to resolve the dispute. Id. Accordingly, on October 21, 2024, the parties filed the instant joint stipulation on Defendants' motion to quash. Dkt. 107.
The Court finds these matters suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to quash is DENIED.
II.
GENERAL STANDARD
Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
*2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is broadly defined to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). However, a court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the issuing and service of subpoenas on nonparties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. If necessary to enforce that subpoena, a party may move to compel the nonparty to comply in the court where the discovery is to be taken. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1)–(2). Under Rule 45, a subpoena must be modified or quashed if it “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies,” or if the subpoena “subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), (iv); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (party issuing a subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena”).
Whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden on a particular witness is a “case specific inquiry.” Thayer v. Chiczewski, 257 F.R.D. 466, 469 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “To determine whether a subpoena imposes undue burden on the recipient, the Court must balance the relevance of information sought, the requesting party's need for the information, and the extent of the burden imposed.” Ret. Bd. of Policemen's Annuity & Ben. Fund of City of Chicago v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 2:13-cv-04392-ODW(CWx), 2013 WL 12139833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013).
Generally, the scope of discovery available through a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26(b). Beaver Cty. Employers Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., No. 3:16-mc-80062-JSC, 2016 WL 3162218, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory comm. note to 1970 amendment). However, while discovery should not be unnecessarily restricted, nonparty discovery is more limited to protect nonparties from harassment, inconvenience, or disclosure of confidential documents. Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, “concern for the unwanted burden thrust upon nonparties is a factor entitled to special weight in evaluating the balance of competing needs.” Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998). However, “third party discovery is a time-honored device to get at the truth of a claim or defense. A party in litigation is not obligated to take the word of an opponent regarding what relevant documents do or do not exist.” L.G. Philips LCD Co., Ltd v. Tatung Co., No. C 07 80073WHA, 2007 WL 869256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2007).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. DEFENDANTS ONLY HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SUBPOENA ON PRIVELEGE GROUNDS
As a preliminary matter, the Court must address the issue of Defendants' standing to move to quash the subpoena. Generally, “a party may not quash a subpoena served upon a non-party on any grounds other than privilege.” Televisa, S.A. de C.V. v. Univision Comms, Inc., 2008 WL 4951213, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008); see also Broadcort Capital Corp. v. Flagler Secs., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 626, 628 (D. Col. 1993) (holding that a nonparty movant had standing to move to quash a subpoena issued to another nonparty for telephone records based on the claim that the records were privileged). Here, Defendant O.A. surely has a privacy interest in his own juvenile records, and therefore he, at least, would have standing to move to quash the subpoena on those grounds. However, Defendants also argue that the subpoena seeks irrelevant material, is overbroad, is not narrowly tailored, and imposes an undue burden. Joint Stip. at 3–6. To the extent Defendants' relevance and overbreadth arguments are applicable to the balance of interests between Plaintiffs' need for discovery and Defendants' privacy interests, the Court will consider them. However, the Court does not address Defendants' arguments as independent bases for quashing the subpoena because they do not have standing to advance these objections arguments on behalf of nonparty Los Angeles Superior Court.
B. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 DOES NOT BAR PRODUCTION
*3 “California Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 provides that a juvenile's case file is confidential and may only be inspected by certain enumerated individuals or those who successfully petition a dependency court for access to the file.” Castillo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 2:12-CV-02760-ODW, 2013 WL 692865, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827. At the outset, it is clear that a federal court is not bound by state law, and thus has authority to order the production of the documents at issue notwithstanding Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code section 827. See Gonzales v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 834–835 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that state law required defendant to petition the juvenile court, but “the district court could have ordered disclosure notwithstanding state law”); see also Meyer v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 21-CV-341-RSH-BLM, 2024 WL 86603, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2024) (collecting cases). However, courts use section 827 as a guide for determining the scope of a similar federal privilege. See, e.g., Shibley v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-CV-00065-JGB-SPX, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2022); see also Horn v. Hornbeak, No. 1:08-CV-1622-LJO-DLB, 2010 WL 1027508, at *4–*5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (“The statute evidences the general policy of favoring confidentiality of juvenile records, intended to protect the privacy rights of the child at issue.”). Indeed, when section 827 would apply, “comity requires that section 827 ‘be respected if at all possible’ and courts should weigh ‘the needs of this case’ against ‘the state interest in keeping the juvenile information confidential.’ ” Meyer, 2024 WL 86603, at *5 (quoting Maldonado v. Sec'y of Cal. Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 2007 WL 4249811, *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007) (granting motion to compel in 1983 action)).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that the information they seek is relevant and necessary to resolve the issues presented in this action. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that O.A.'s juvenile records are relevant to show whether he had abusive tendencies. Joint Stip. at 9–10. Plaintiffs also note that California law allows parents to be present for, and requires that schools be given notice of, juvenile court proceedings, and thus O.A.'s records could help establish whether the school or O.A.'s parents had knowledge of O.A.'s behavior—a key allegation in the case. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs argue the records may be relevant to the motives and credibility of witnesses who will admit or deny that O.A. engaged in certain conduct. Id.
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the subpoena is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information, but do not actually explain their position, nor do they refute Plaintiffs' specific contentions regarding relevance. See id. at 5–6. Confusingly, Defendants also express a belief that there are no responsive documents to Plaintiffs' request, which not only undercuts Defendants' contentions that the subpoena seeks irrelevant and privileged information, but also raises a question as to the purpose of this motion to quash, in general. Notably, Defendants do not articulate why the protective order in place in this action would be insufficient to protect O.A.'s privacy interests; the Court has already noted in a previous order that the protective order applies to nonparties and is generally sufficient to alleviate privacy concerns. See Dkt. 96 at 3; Dkt. 86 (protective order).
Ultimately, given Defendants failure to explain their objections or refute Plaintiffs' arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' need for the information sought outweighs the privacy interest at stake in this case, and that any lingering privacy concerns can be adequately mitigated by the protective order in this case. In coming to this conclusion, the Court places some weight on the fact that Defendants do not believe there will be any responsive documents, which renders most, if not all, of their concerns moot.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion to quash is DENIED. Los Angeles Superior Court should respond within fourteen days of this order.
*4 IT IS SO ORDERED.