A. Statutory Requirements Under Section 1782

Beginning with the three statutory requirements for a Section 1782 application, Respondents do not dispute that Laggner satisfies the second and third requirements. As a petitioner in the Cayman Proceedings, Laggner qualifies as an “interested person” for purposes of the third requirement. Laggner contends that the discovery will be offered in the Cayman Proceedings, which means it is “for use in” a foreign litigation. ECF No. 4 at 8. Respondents do not dispute that the discovery that Laggner seeks is relevant to the Cayman Proceedings and would increase Laggner's chances of success in that matter. See Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We therefore hold that Mees has satisfied § 1782’s “for use” requirement by showing that the materials she seeks are to be used at some stage of a foreign proceeding that was within reasonable contemplation at the time of the proceedings below.”). Laggner therefore satisfies this second statutory requirement.

The parties spend most of their five briefs contesting whether the Application meets the first requirement, which is that Respondents reside in or can be “found” within this District. As the Second Circuit has explained in construing this language, “the statutory scope of ‘found’ extends to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.” In re Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 527 (2d Cir. 2019). In other words, the person from whom discovery is sought must be subject to personal jurisdiction within this District. Because there are two different Respondents, it is necessary to consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over each of Watson and TBLG is consistent with due process.

*3 In analyzing the Constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has “distinguished between specific or case-linked jurisdiction and general or all-purpose jurisdiction.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017). Specific jurisdiction requires the suit to arise out of or relate to defendant's contacts with the forum. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). In contrast, general jurisdiction allows a court to hear “any and all claims” against a defendant. BNSF, 581 U.S. at 413.

1. General Jurisdiction

“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. Additionally, an individual may be subject to “tag” jurisdiction when served with process while within the district. See Loughlin v. Goord, 558 F. Supp. 3d 136, 139-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), reconsideration denied, 2021 WL 4523502 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021), aff'd, 2022 WL 9575656 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2022). See also Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality) (service of process on individual transiently in California satisfied requirements of due process). Tag jurisdiction is a form of general jurisdiction, meaning that an individual served with process in a given state can be sued there on any claim, regardless of its relationship to the forum. Loughlin at 139.

General jurisdiction over corporations is consistent with due process “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). The “paradigm” forums in which a corporate defendant is “at home” are the corporation's place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Id. at 137. The exercise of general jurisdiction is not limited to those forums, and in an “exceptional case,” a corporation's operations in another forum “may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” 571 U.S. at 139 n.19.

Since Daimler, the Supreme Court has clarified that even substantial permanent operations in a state do not render a corporation “essentially at home there.” In BNSF, a defendant railroad was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Montana despite having over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees there. 581 U.S. at 414. Quoting Daimler, the BNSF court noted that a “corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id.

a. General Jurisdiction Over TBLG

Applying these principles here, Laggner fails to show that TBLG is subject to general personal jurisdiction in this District. Laggner's opening brief claims that TBLG “maintains its North American Head Office” at 888 Seventh Avenue in New York City. ECF No. 4 at 8. This assertion is unsupported by any affidavit. Respondents dispute this claim, contending that this New York office belongs to TBOL, Inc., which is distinct from TBLG, the company from which discovery is sought. ECF No. 8 at 4, 8. TBLG supports this assertion with an affidavit from Vania Jussara, the Chief People Officer of TBLG. ECF No. 8-1.

More importantly for purposes of applying Daimler, the Jussara Affidavit states that TBLG was incorporated in London in 2020 and is headquartered in London. ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 3. Respondents bolster this assertion with a Declaration from Watson, TBLG's CEO, attaching records showing that The Bank of London Group Limited is registered as a private limited company in the United Kingdom and that its registered office address is in London. ECF No. 15 (Watson Declaration); ECF No. 15-2 (printout of corporate registration information).

*4 Laggner never directly refutes TBLG's showing that it is incorporated under UK law and has its principal place of business in London. Instead, Laggner relies on his claim that TBLG (which it refers to as “TBOL”) has its North American head office at 888 Seventh Avenue in Manhattan. Laggner submits a declaration from his outside litigation counsel attaching 15 exhibits, which include internet pages and social media posts in which “The Bank of London” described the office at 888 Seventh Avenue as its “North American Headquarters.”[3] In response, TBLG insists that this New York office belongs to a different company, TBOL, Inc., which is not the entity from which discovery is sought. TBLG also points out that several of Laggner's exhibits state that London is the global headquarters of whichever entity is described as “The Bank of London.”

Regardless of which company occupies the offices at 888 Seventh Avenue, Laggner fails to make a prima facie showing that TBLG is either incorporated in New York or has its principal place of business here. Under Daimler and progeny, in order for TBLG to be subject to general jurisdiction in New York, Laggner must demonstrate that TBLG represents an “exceptional case” in which a corporation is considered to be “at home” in a jurisdiction other than these two paradigmatic locations. Even assuming that TBLG maintains its North American head office in New York, that is not sufficient to subject TBLG to general jurisdiction in this District. To start, there is nothing “exceptional” about a foreign company basing its North American operations in New York and the cases cited in the briefing suggest that many foreign financial institutions do the same. Contrary to Laggner's argument, the case law does not support a finding that having a North American head office in New York subjects a foreign corporation with its principal place of business elsewhere to general jurisdiction in New York.

Laggner's best authority for his argument is In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA, 524 B.R. 488 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). In that case, the court found that Deutsche Bank was subject to general jurisdiction based on the location of its “North American Regional Head Office” in New York, which occupied 1.6 million square feet of space and employed 1,600 personnel. 524 B.R. at 507-08. But subsequent cases have criticized this decision and declined to follow it. See In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 11 MDL 2262, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147561 at *154-55, n.43 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) (“we cannot agree with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that even very substantial corporate operations (regardless of whether measured in money, personnel, space or time) in a given forum suffice to make a defendant at home in the forum”).[4] Additionally, the reasoning of In re Hellas, which focused on the number of employees and the size and duration of an office lease, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in BNSF, which highlighted Daimler's observation that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant's instate contacts.” BNSF, 581 U.S. at 414 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139, n.20) (finding that 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana did not subject a railway to general jurisdiction).

*5 Laggner cites several other decisions, but none squarely holds that a foreign corporation with its principal place of business outside the United States is subject to general jurisdiction in New York. The decision in In re GMJ Asset Mgmt. Co., 22-mc-123, 2022 WL 4547445 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2022), which resulted from an uncontested 1782 application, found that U.S. subsidiaries that maintained their headquarters in New York were subject to general jurisdiction. In re Hornbeam Corp., 14-mc-424, 2014 WL 8775453 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2014), which also resulted from an uncontested 1782 application, concluded that the parties from which discovery was sought “are located within the Southern District of New York,” without further discussion. Neither of these decisions specified that respondents were subject to general jurisdiction. To the contrary, the discussion in Hornbeam focused on the fact that the respondent banks were being asked to produce records relating to their likely service “as intermediaries for wire transfers of funds from outside the United States to within the United States,” which suggests that they were subject to specific jurisdiction.[5] Hornbeam, 2014 WL 8775453 at *2. Neither of these decisions concluded that the applicant had presented an “exceptional case” in which a corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction somewhere other than its state of incorporation or principal place of business.[6]

b. General Jurisdiction over Watson

Laggner's opening brief claims that Watson “can be found in New York, New York, through TBOL's North American Head Office located in New York, New York.” ECF No. 4 at 8. This statement is unsupported by an affidavit. But even taking it at face value, it fails to specify whether New York is Watson's primary work location or whether he simply visits this New York office occasionally. Respondents counter with declarations stating that Watson is a British citizen who no longer has U.S. permanent residency status, and who is domiciled in London. ECF Nos. 8-1, 15. For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile. Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

In his second brief, Laggner does not dispute the governing legal standard, citing Daimler for the proposition that “the paradigmatic forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.” ECF No. 10 at 5 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). Laggner also cites New York precedent explaining that a domicile is “established by physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there.” ECF No. 10 at 5. Laggner asserts that Watson maintains a residence in New York, citing a 2021 interview in which Watson said he split his time between New York and London. ECF No. 10 at 9 (citing ECF No. 11-14). But this same document also described Watson was a “non-U.S. citizen.” Laggner claims that Watson maintains a condominium in Manhattan, citing a document described as a “Background Report” without any other explanatory or authenticating information. ECF No. 10 at 9 (citing ECF No. 11-6). But this Background Report also lists addresses in California and Oregon associated with Watson.

*6 Laggner's assertions fall short of presenting a prima facie case that Watson is domiciled in New York. See Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 456 (observing that to establish New York domicile, plaintiff should allege, e.g., that defendant holds a New York driver's license, maintains personal accounts at New York banks, files New York tax returns and lists New York as his home address on such tax returns). As Respondents point out, “[a]n individual may have multiple residences, but only one domicile.” ECF No. 14 at 7 (quoting Chen v. Guo Liang Lu, 144 A.D.3d 735 (2d Dep't 2016)). Even assuming that Watson owns a condominium located in this District, that is not enough to make him subject to general jurisdiction here given the unrefuted evidence that he is a British citizen and is no longer authorized to live permanently in the United States.

Finally, Laggner emphasizes that the text of Section 1782 refers to where a respondent “resides,” suggesting that maintaining a residence within this District is all that is required. But Laggner cites no authority supporting the conclusion that Daimler's “at home” requirement can be satisfied through ownership of a secondary residence, i.e., a residential property that is not the respondent's domicile. While Section 1782’s jurisdictional reach extends to the limits of due process, it cannot extend beyond those limitations. See Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 526, n.6 (noting both parties “appear to assume that ‘resides’ is properly understood to refer to where an individual or entity ‘is essentially at home’ for purposes of general personal jurisdiction”). Owning a secondary residence in New York has been found insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. See Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting assertion of general jurisdiction over respondent owing residential property in New York absent “allegations indicating that Betancourt's residential property is his ‘home.’ ”).

In the fifth and final brief filed in this matter, Laggner shifts focus to a different theory of personal jurisdiction: that Watson is subject to “tag” jurisdiction because he “was personally served with a copy of [Laggner's] Application” at his condominium within this District on March 10, 2023. ECF No. 22 at 1. Respondents filed an affidavit denying that the person served was Watson. ECF No. 18-1. In determining whether an application meets Section 1782’s jurisdictional requirements, the pleadings and affidavits are construed in the light most favorable to the party asserting personal jurisdiction. See Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 526-27. Thus, Laggner's assertion that Watson was served with the Application within this District is to be credited at this stage.

The Second Circuit has held “that if a person is served with a subpoena while physically present in the district of the court that issued the discovery order, then for purposes of § 1782(a), he is ‘found’ in that district.” In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 180 (2002). Additionally, another court in this District reaffirmed, in the context of a civil action as opposed to a Section 1782 application, that service of process while in the state “is sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.” Loughlin v. Goord, 558 F. Supp. 3d 126, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). Accordingly, crediting his affidavit of service for purposes of this Application, Laggner has shown that Watson “can be found” in this District within the meaning of Section 1782.

But that does not mean Watson is within the jurisdiction of this Court just yet. The cases discussing “tag” jurisdiction refer to a defendant being served with a summons within the state. A summons is a jurisdictionally significant instrument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant”). Laggner never claims that Watson was served with a summons and the docket in this matter does not reflect any summons ever being issued. Because this proceeding is not a regular civil action, the instrument that brings respondents within the Court's jurisdiction is a subpoena. In Edelman, the court had already authorized service of subpoenas and the respondent “was served with a subpoena.” 295 F.3d at 174. The facts are very different here: Watson could not have been served with a subpoena in March 2023 because the Court had not authorized Laggner to serve a subpoena at that time. While Laggner's service of his Application demonstrates that Watson can be found in this District, Watson has not actually been brought before this Court and has not yet formally been “found” within this District.

*7 In conclusion, Laggner has demonstrated that Watson “can be found” within this District, which satisfies the first of the three requirements imposed by Section 1782. But Watson need not provide any discovery unless and until the Court authorizes service of a subpoena and Watson is actually served with a subpoena within this District, which would subject him to “tag” jurisdiction. Additionally, as the Second Circuit has explained, the fact that an individual respondent to a Section 1782 application is “found” within this District does not necessarily mean that he can be forced to testify in the United States. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d at 181. Even if Watson is properly served within this District, he would have the benefit of the protections that any subpoena recipient enjoys under Rule 45.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

In contrast to general jurisdiction, which allows a court to hear any dispute involving the party before the court, for specific jurisdiction, “there must be an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). While most decisions addressing specific jurisdiction arise in the context of determining whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for purposes of imposing liability, the Second Circuit has explained how this concept applies in the context of a Section 1782 application:

In re Del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 530 (2d Cir. 2019). In Del Valle Ruiz, the Second Circuit found that where the respondent's forum contacts postdated the transaction that was the subject of discovery, this test could not be met because such contacts could not be but-for causes of the availability of the evidence sought. But even for the contacts that predated the events in question, the Second Circuit found the required nexus was lacking because the petitioner's claim and “the bulk of the discovery sought” arose from a separate financial transaction. 939 F.3d at 531.

a. Specific Jurisdiction Over TBLG

Here, Laggner fails to show a sufficient connection between TBLG's alleged New York contacts and the discovery that he seeks. While Laggner provides a laundry list of U.S. contacts by TBLG (assuming, for the sake of discussion that these contacts by “TBOL” are contacts by TBLG), he never shows that these contacts are connected to the events alleged in the Petition or to the discovery sought through the Application. See ECF No. 10 at 8-9. To the contrary, the Petition in the Cayman Proceedings states that it involves conduct that took place in 2016 to 2018 and that many of these events occurred in Mexico. ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 16, 20–21. In summary, Laggner fails to show any genuine connection between TBLG's alleged New York contacts and the documents he seeks through this Application. Thus, the Application fails to show that TBLG is subject to specific personal jurisdiction for purposes of Section 1782.

b. Specific Jurisdiction Over Anthony Watson

As with his argument regarding TBLG, Laggner lists a number of Watson's “contacts to this District,” including that he acts for and controls TBLG, that he “routinely transacts business with New York entities and attends meetings in the New York headquarters.” ECF No. 10 at 10. The problem with these assertions is that while they claim that (a) Watson has contacts with New York, (b) Watson founded and controls TBLG (again, assuming that Laggner's numerous references to “TBOL” actually mean TBLG), and (c) the Cayman Proceedings claim that Watson and others used their control over Uphold to obtain personal interests in the Bank of London, Laggner never shows what is necessary to demonstrate specific jurisdiction: that the discovery materials sought resulted in some way from Watson's New York contacts. The closest Laggner comes is alleging that Watson had contacts with New York at the same time as the event giving rise to Laggner's claims in the Cayman Proceedings. But a mere temporal overlap without some substantive nexus cannot support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Watson.

B. The Intel Factors

*8 Even where the three requirements set forth in Section 1782 are met, a court is not obligated to provide discovery, but must exercise discretion to determine whether to grant the requested discovery guided by the four factors provided in Intel, 542 U.S. 241. Laggner addressed these factors in his opening brief, arguing (1) the Respondents are not parties to the Cayman Proceedings; (2) there is no indication that the court presiding over the Cayman Proceedings would not be receptive to the information sought; (3) there is no indication that the instant Application is an end-run around the discovery procedures or policies in the Cayman Proceedings; and (4) the discovery sought is not unduly intrusive or burdensome.

Respondents’ first brief, ECF No. 8, is entirely silent as to the Intel factors, and focuses exclusively on whether the threshold requirements of Section 1782 are met. Only in their second brief, ECF No. 14, do Respondents even address the Intel factors and their arguments are cursory. See ECF No. 14 at 14–15. To the extent they are addressed at all, Respondents’ discussion of the first three Intel factors is limited to a single sentence at the very end of its second brief and provides no basis to conclude that the information sought either would be unwelcome in or would constitute an end-run around the Cayman Proceedings. Id. at 15. While Respondents spend slightly more words on the fourth Intel factor, their arguments as to burden are conclusory and amount to little more than paraphrasing the document requests without providing any indication of how many responsive documents there are or how burdensome it would be to produce them. Id. at 14–15. Instead, Respondents state that they reserve the right to move to quash the subpoena if it is authorized, suggesting that they prefer to address the burden of providing the requested discovery at a later stage. See ECF No. 8 at 2, n.1; ECF No. 14 at 2, n.2, 14, n.5. Based on the presentation in the briefing, the Intel factors weigh in favor of authorizing Laggner to attempt to serve subpoenas on Watson while he is physically present within this District. If Laggner succeeds, Watson will have an opportunity at that point to move the quash the subpoenas. See In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171 (finding requirements of Section 1782 were met, but remanding to consider whether subpoena should be quashed).

III. Conclusion

Laggner has satisfied the three statutory requirements for obtaining discovery under Section 1782 only as to Watson. Laggner has made a prima facie showing that Watson “can be found” in this District, but Watson has not yet been “found” here because he has not been served with a validly authorized subpoena. The Application should be DENIED as to TBLG for a failure to show that it “can be found” within this District.

Focusing on Watson, the Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the Application. Watson is not a party to the Cayman Proceedings and there is no reason to believe that discovery from Watson would be unwelcome or would circumvent any restrictions or policies in the Cayman Proceedings. Watson has failed to show that it would be intrusive and burdensome to provide the requested discovery. Accordingly, the Application should be GRANTED as to Watson.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Andrew L. Carter, United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Carter.

*9 FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).