(Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff signed the instant Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas on November 18, 2024, and it was filed on November 25, 2024. (Dkt. No. 354.) His Motion asks the Court to issue subpoenas to depose Mr. Olson and several individuals connected to Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”). (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoenas with this filing. (Dkt. No. 353; see also Dkt. No. 352.) On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Amended Notice of Deposition (“Notice”), stating he intends to depose only PenFed and Mr. Olson. (Dkt. No. 355.) Plaintiff's Notice states that the “deposition will take place using a qualified court reporter/deposition expert at 10:00am ET on a date to be determined by the parties through an electronic platform conference call.” (Id.) PenFed filed a response in opposition on December 9, 2024 (Dkt. No. 361), to which Plaintiff filed a reply on December 19, 2024 (Dkt. No. 369). Equifax filed a response in opposition on December 9, 2024. (Dkt. No. 360.) In his reply (Dkt. No. 370), Plaintiff clarifies that he no longer seeks to depose the individuals associated with Equifax. (See Dkt. No. 355.) Because Plaintiff no longer seeks subpoenas related to Equifax, the Court finds that portion of his Motion to be moot.

*3 All civil discovery, whether sought from parties or nonparties, is limited in scope by Rule 26(b)(1) which provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Subpoenas issued to nonparties are governed by Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “adopts the standard codified in Rule 26” in determining what is discoverable. Schaaf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 233 F.R.D. 451, 453 (E.D.N.C. 2005).

Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil procedure “is broad in scope and freely permitted.” Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003). The broad scope of discovery notwithstanding, the court may impose appropriate limitations on discovery “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The court may require restrictions “forbidding the disclosure or discovery” or “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Id. 26(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(D). The district court has broad discretion in determining relevance for discovery purposes. Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482, 489 (4th Cir. 1992).

Relevant here, Rule 30 allows a party to take depositions, including depositions of organizations pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). “The broad scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26(b)(1) applies to Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.” Martin v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib., LLC, 313 F.R.D. 1, 6 (E.D.N.C. 2016). “To the extent information sought in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and is known or reasonably available to the corporation, it must provide a corporate designee or multiple designees prepared to provide that information.” Coryn Group II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 235, 238 (D. Md. 2010). “A deposition of a deponent in his individual capacity differs from that of a deponent as a corporate representative.” Ramsey v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib., LLC, No. 5:14-cv-26-BR, 2016 WL 676378, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2016). “A Rule 30(b)(6) designee speaks as the corporation and testifies regarding the knowledge, perceptions, and opinions of the corporation[, while] when the same deponent testifies in his individual capacity, he provides only his personal knowledge, perceptions, and opinions.” In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2:10-cv-01224, 2013 WL 1722998, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 22, 2013).

*4 As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks to depose Mr. Olson “who has knowledge and information regarding the claims in this case,” and he also seeks to depose a representative of PenFed pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 355; 369.) In response, PenFed opposes the issuance of a subpoena to Mr. Olson and asserts that the topics Plaintiff seeks to address in his 30(b)(6) deposition are not relevant to this action. (Dkt. No. 361.) Here, PenFed argues that Plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the Court's October 17, 2024 Order because he failed to notice the 30(b)(6) deposition by November 18, 2024, and Plaintiff instead moved for the issuance of deposition subpoenas to individual fact witnesses and noticed those depositions. (Id. at 1; see Dkt. Nos. 352; 354.) PenFed asserts that it reached out to Plaintiff after those filings and asked Plaintiff “if he wanted to depose Olson in lieu of a corporate representative.” (Dkt. No. 361 at 3.) At that point, Plaintiff confirmed he wants to take two depositions, one of Mr. Olson in his individual capacity and a separate Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Id.; Dkt. No. 361-2.) On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff served PenFed with notice of those depositions along with a list of “questions” for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Dkt. Nos. 361-4; 361-5.)

In support of his Motion, Plaintiff states that he properly served “a Rule 30 deposition notice before the deadline” and then amended the notice after receiving Defendants’ objections alleging noncompliance with Rule 30(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 369 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is necessary because “Plaintiff's topics, including PenFed's loan funding practices, account ledgers, and reporting to third parties, necessitate testimony from a representative with comprehensive firsthand personal knowledge.” (Id. at 3.) According to Plaintiff, Mr. Olson's “deposition alone cannot substitute for the required 30(b)(6) testimony.” (Id.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff's failure to comply with the deadlines set forth in the Court's October 17, 2024 Order was not done in bad faith, and given the brief period of delay at issue, the Court will not deny Plaintiff's pro se Motion as untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (“When an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect”); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (“Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect, it is clear that ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat ‘elastic concept’ and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.”); Harman v. Unisys Corp., 356 F. App'x 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed a party to file a motion response one day out of time, citing Rule 6(b)); Stanley v. United States of Am., 2016 WL 631995, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2016) (finding a three-day delay in filing weighed in favor of finding excusable neglect).

PenFed served Plaintiff with Mr. Olson's Second Declaration on November 4, 2024, and it appears Plaintiff seeks to depose Mr. Olson about his personal knowledge, perceptions, and opinions regarding the information stated in that declaration. More specifically, in his declaration, Mr. Olson details Plaintiff's three credit accounts with PenFed that are at issue in this action, and he further avers that “PenFed has never sold, assigned, or transferred its ownership rights with respect to any of” the three accounts. (Dkt. No. 345-1 at 3.) Additionally, as discussed supra, Mr. Olson avers that “PenFed has not been compensated by the [Federal Reserve Bank], [Plaintiff], or anybody else, for the debt [Plaintiff] owes in connection to” the three accounts. (Id. at 5.) The Court finds the Mr. Olson's knowledge about Plaintiff's three credit accounts with PenFed is relevant and proportional to Plaintiff's claims in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion on this issue and will allow Plaintiff the opportunity to subpoena Mr. Olson by January 16, 2025.[2] Mr. Olson's deposition must take place by February 10, 2025.

*5 Here, the Court advises Plaintiff that Mr. Olson's deposition is not an opportunity to explore Plaintiff's theory that PenFed has been compensated by the FRB for any debt owed by Plaintiff. Mr. Olson directly refutes this theory in his declaration, and as the Court stated in a prior Order, “Plaintiff's ... fantastical theory that financial institutions can create new money by issuing loans to consumers and seeking reimbursement from the FRB ... lacks an arguable basis in fact or law.” (Dkt. No. 358 at 8.) Indeed, Plaintiff's claims against PenFed center on PenFed's alleged inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff's three credit accounts. Accordingly, PenFed's general financial and accounting practices also are not relevant to Plaintiff's claims against PenFed.

Based on this same reasoning, the Court finds that the majority of the proposed questions submitted by Plaintiff for the 30(b)(6) deposition are not relevant and proportional to Plaintiff's claims. Upon careful review, the Court finds that Questions 7–19 and 22–30 directly relate to Plaintiff's theory that PenFed has been compensated by the FRB for any debt owed by Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 361-5 at 3–7.) Similarly, Questions 1–6, 10–21, and 34–35 directly relate to PenFed's general financial and accounting practices. (Id. at 1–5, 8.) None of the foregoing questions are relevant and proportional to the inaccurate reporting dispute giving rise to Plaintiff's claims against PenFed, and the Court finds Questions 1–30 and 34–35 cannot be asked during Plaintiff's 30(b)(6) deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Questions 31–33, however, appear relevant to Plaintiff's claims that PenFed's reporting was inaccurate and misleading by failing to report Plaintiff's credit accounts with a zero balance where the accounts at issue had been sold and/or assigned and where the accounts were listed as charged off. (Id. at 7–8.) Accordingly, these questions, and such related topics, would be allowed at the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to the extent Plaintiff seeks to depose PenFed pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) on Questions 31–33 and such related topics. However, a subpoena is not necessary for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of PenFed, a party to this case. Rather, Plaintiff should notice the 30(b)(6) deposition, which is limited to Questions 31–33 (see Dkt. No. 361-5 at 7–8) and such related topics. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Once served with the deposition notice under Rule 30(b)(6), PenFed is required to produce one or more witnesses knowledgeable about the subject matter of the noticed topics. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Vegas Constr. Co., 251 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Nev. 2008); Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989). “It is the sole right of the corporation to designate a representative for a deposition, not the party issuing the subpoena.” Joiner v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc., No. 105-cv-321, 2006 WL 2669370, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2006). Plaintiff must serve his deposition notice by January 16, 2025, and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition must take place by February 10, 2025.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas (Dkt. No. 354) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff may subpoena Mr. Olson by January 16, 2025, and Mr. Olson's deposition must take place by February 10, 2025. Plaintiff must notice his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of PenFed by January 16, 2025, and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition must take place by February 10, 2025. The parties are ordered to file a status update advising the Court of the date(s) of these depositions once the date is decided. The dispositive motions deadline remains March 3, 2025.

IT IS SO ORDERED.