Nava v. Cal. State Superior Ct.
Nava v. Cal. State Superior Ct.
2025 WL 504430 (C.D. Cal. 2025)
January 31, 2025

Rocconi, Margo A.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Failure to Preserve
Failure to Produce
Sanctions
Bad Faith
Possession Custody Control
Protective Order
Cost Recovery
Spoliation
Video
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Summary
The plaintiff, a prisoner, filed multiple requests for video discovery, alleging that the defendants intentionally withheld and destroyed video evidence. The court denied the plaintiff's request for sanctions, finding that any delay in producing the evidence was either justified or harmless. The court also denied the plaintiff's request for spoliation sanctions, as it could not determine with certainty that the defendants were on notice of the plaintiff's claims before the evidence was automatically deleted. The court also denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against prison staff.
Bobby Nava
v.
California State Superior Court, et al
Case No. 2:20-cv-9045-AB (MAR)
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed January 31, 2025
Rocconi, Margo A., United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER RE: REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS, DKTS. 161, 166, 175, 179, 206

I.
BACKGROUND
*1 Plaintiff has filed several requests regarding certain video discovery that has been a consistent issue throughout this case. The Court summarized the relevant discovery proceedings in its June 18, 2024 order:
Plaintiff filed two motions to compel over a year and a half ago, which sought the video discovery, as well as other items. See Dkts. 73 (first motion to compel); 77 (second motion to compel). The Court ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's motions to compel. Dkts. 97 (Court order); 99 (response). The Court then stayed discovery in this action pending the resolution of settlement proceedings. Dkt. 101. After the proceedings were unsuccessful, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an update on the status of discovery in response to Defendants' earlier response. Dkt. 110.
Ultimately, the Court denied Plaintiff's motions in part and granted them in part. Dkt. 116. Notably, the Court granted Plaintiff's motions with respect to a video of an interview between Plaintiff and Sgt. Itani, noting that, while Defendants averred that the video recording of the interview did not exist, Plaintiff had “presented convincing evidence that further documents related to this interview may exist.” Id. at 4. Still, the Court acknowledged that it could not compel the production of documents that do not exist; accordingly, the Court found that “to the extent that, after a diligent search, Defendants honestly claim that they have no further responsive documents under their control, Defendants may satisfy their obligations with respect to [the] order by certifying that no further responsive documents exist, explaining their search methodology, and providing a brief explanation rebutting Plaintiff's showing regarding why such documents are likely to exist.” Id. The Court noted that “[i]n [that] case, if Plaintiff maintains that Defendants is still withholding documents, Plaintiff's remedy will be to impeach Defendants at trial or in dispositive motions.” Id. The Court also denied Plaintiff's request for sanctions because he did not make the requests in his motions, and thus Defendants had not had an opportunity to meaningfully brief the issue; the Court acknowledged that Plaintiff may bring a separate sanctions motion in the future if he maintained his allegations of spoliation and discovery misconduct.. Id.
As the case proceeded, Plaintiff has made numerous requests concerning the prison's alleged failure to allow him to sufficiently review the video evidence in this case; the Court has repeatedly ordered both counsel for Defendants and the prison staff to ensure that Plaintiff has had opportunities to view the videos they have provided. See Dkts. 50, and seeking court order directing prison to make available audio and video discovery); Dkt. 66 (minute order requiring prison to make discovery available to Plaintiff); Dkt. 77 (Plaintiff's motion to compel); Dkt. 81 (minute order requesting status report on discovery); Dkt. 86, 89, 94–95 (Plaintiff's status reports); Dkt. 90 (Defendants' status report); Dkt. 97 (minute order requiring response to Plaintiff's discovery motions in Dkts. 73, 77, 94, and 95); Dkt. 99 (Defendants' status report); Dkt. 110 (minute order seeking status report on discovery); Dkt. 116 (minute order denying requests for discovery in Dkts. 73, 77, 94–95, extending discovery for Plaintiff to view audio and video discovery); Dkt. 126 (minute order denying motion for extension of discovery, but ordering prison to make available audio and video discovery); Dkt. 138 (Plaintiff's request for extension of time to file opposition to motion for summary judgment to allow him to view video discovery); Dkt. 146 (similar request); Dkt. 148 (similar request).
*2 Most recently, on April 15, 2024, the Court ordered counsel for Defendants to “confirm with the prison litigation coordinator at the facility that Plaintiff has been able to view the discovery and submit an update to this Court.” Dkt. 152 at 4. Furthermore, the Court granted Plaintiff an extension to respond to Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment and ordered that, “if at all practicable, the discovery shall be made available to Plaintiff at least twice more over the next sixty days, so that he may reference it in compiling his opposition.” Id. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the requests addressed in this order, which, as discussed above, ask that the Court: order Defendants to resend the video discovery, order the prison to provide better equipment for Plaintiff to view the discovery, order Defendants or the prison to provide the discovery to an attorney who is considering taking Plaintiff's case, and impose sanctions for Defendants' alleged discovery misconduct and spoliation of other video evidence. Dkts. 158–59, 161, 165.
...
[Plaintiff's motions for sanctions] alleg[e] that Defendants have withheld and intentionally destroyed video evidence. Dkts. 161, 166. The motions appear to primarily concern the interview with Sgt. Itani described in previous motions, which Defendants allege has never existed, and video of Plaintiff's back brace being taken from him, which Defendants acknowledge existed, but claim was purged pursuant to a twelve-month retention policy prior to the start of the litigation. See Dkt. 99 at 2, 6– 7.... Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants actually provided video of the Sgt. Itani interview, despite representing previously that the video did not exist. Dkt. 166 at 4 (“Upon the denial of Plaintiff's request for additional time for discovery in November 2023 Defendants provide[d] video footage of Sgt. Itani interview with Plaintiff. This was the video that defense counsel and defendants said never took place and did not exist.”). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that, just six months after the incident, he filed a grievance regarding the incident where his back brace was taken. Dkt. 161 at 18. If true, this allegation could go towards showing that Defendants had a duty to preserve the video footage prior to the time it would have been purged due to their twelve-month retention policy. See Musse v. King Cnty., No. C18-1736-JCC, 2021 WL 4709875, *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2021) (noting that obligation to preserve attaches when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, which may arise before litigation is commenced, and finding litigation was reasonably foreseeable before complaint was filed in part because the county had opened an investigation on the incident).
ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 169 at 1–3, 6.
Ultimately, in the June 18, 2024 order, the Court admonished the prison staff to continue allowing Plaintiff to review the video discovery as needed, but denied Plaintiff's requests insofar as they sought specific equipment or at-will access to the video discovery. Id. at 4. The Court also ordered Defendants and the prison staff to cooperate to assist Plaintiff in allowing a potential attorney to view the video discovery. Id. at 4–5. Finally, the Court ordered Defendants to file a supplemental response addressing Plaintiff's allegations in his various motions for sanctions. Id. at 5–7. The Court stayed the briefing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment until the motions for sanctions were resolved. Id.
On June 20, 2024, counsel for Defendants filed a response indicating that they would produce the video discovery to Plaintiff's potential attorney upon the execution of an agreement to abide by a protective order signed by the Court. Dkt. 171. On July 1, 2024, Defendants filed a response describing the circumstances of the delay in providing Plaintiff with the Sgt. Itani interview video. Dkt. 174.
On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed another request for sanctions, alleging that Defendants would have been on notice of his claims and therefore should be held responsible for not retaining any video evidence that has since been purged. Dkt. 175. Plaintiff also filed a separate response on July 19, indicating that he opposed Defendants' requirement that his putative attorney agree to a protective order and again asked the Court to order Defendants send him the video discovery, as well as to unseal certain of Defendants' exhibit to their motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 179. Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff's filing on July 23, 2024. Dkt. 180.
*3 On July 31, 2024, the Court ordered Defendants to file a surreply addressing Plaintiff's allegations and arguments related to the alleged withholding of video discovery. Dkt. 182. The Court also ordered Defendants to address Plaintiff's argument regarding the necessity of a protective order. Id. Defendants filed the surreply on August 6, 2024. Dkt. 183. Plaintiff filed several other responses. Dkts. 184, 187.
Notably, on December 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed another request for sanctions that echoed many of the same allegations brought in his other requests. Dkt. 206. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally withheld the video of the Sgt. Itani interview. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that counsel for Defendants conspired with the prison staff to interfere with his outgoing legal mail, thereby preventing him from communicating with attorneys that might take Plaintiff's case. Id. Plaintiff also appears to request that the Court appoint him counsel. Id.
As has been the case throughout this action, Plaintiff's frequent and repetitive filings make it difficult for the Court to identify Plaintiff's specific requests. Synthesizing Plaintiff's myriad filings, the Court has identified the following outstanding requests: (1) Plaintiff's request for discovery sanctions for Defendants' alleged withholding or spoliating of video evidence; (2) Plaintiff's request for an order preventing further interference with his legal mail; (3) Plaintiff's request that he be allowed to send discovery/sealed exhibits to putative attorneys without a protective order; (4) Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel; and (5) Plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint with allegations from the video evidence he has received during discovery.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS
To the Court's eye, it appears as though Plaintiff requests sanctions both: (1) with respect to Defendants' alleged withholding of the Sgt. Itani video, which they have since produced; and (2) with respect to Defendants' alleged failure to preserve other stationary video footage, which they admit existed but was purged due to an automatic twelve-month retention policy.
1. Alleged withholding of the Sgt. Itani video
a. Applicable law
With respect to the withholding of evidence, Rule 37(c)(1) provides that:
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Rule 37(b)(2)(A) lists the following sanctions:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
*4 (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth” to the requirements of Rule 26 and is a “self-executing, automatic sanction to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of material.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note (1993)). The district court has wide latitude in issuing these sanctions. Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1106. “In determining whether this sanction should be imposed, the burden is on the party facing the sanction ... to demonstrate that the failure to comply with Rule 26(a) is substantially justified or harmless.” Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Yeti, 259 F.3d at 1107 (“Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1) is that the burden is on the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness.”)). The Ninth Circuit has articulated several factors for the Court to consider in this determination, including: “(1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not disclosing the evidence.” Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003)).
b. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be sanctioned for their delay in providing a video of Sgt. Itani's interview with Plaintiff about the incidents at issue in this lawsuit. Defendants do not dispute that they were obligated to produce the video under Rule 26 or in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests. However, Defendants initially represented to both Plaintiff and this Court that the Sgt. Itani video did not exist. See Dkt. 116 at 2–3 (order on Plaintiff's motions to compel, summarizing Defendants' repeated insistence that the Itani video did not exist). After the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to the video, Defendants located the video, and eventually produced it to Plaintiff. See Dkt. 174-1, Declaration of Deputy Christopher Deacon (“Deacon Decl.”). Plaintiff argues that the delay was an intentional tactic to prevent him from amending his complaint with whatever he may have discovered from the video, or to otherwise impede his ability to litigate the case. See, e.g., Dkt. 206 at 4. Defendants argue that the delay was unintentional and that they immediately produced the video after locating it on a repeat sweep of the relevant files in response to the Court's order on Plaintiff's motion to compel. See Dkt. 174.
In any case, it is undisputed that Defendants initially failed to comply with their obligation produce the Sgt. Itani video. Thus, the burden shifts to Defendants to show that the delay in producing the video was substantially justified or harmless. The Court is inclined to find the Defendants' delay was substantially justified as an oversight, rather than the result of deliberate withholding. Defendants note that the initial search required manual inspection of hundreds of folders. See Deacon Decl. This provides a reasonable excuse for Defendants' initial failure to locate the video, as well as an explanation for why they were suddenly able to locate it after the Court's order prompted a more thorough search. At the same time, Plaintiff's argument that the delay was intentional is not well-supported by the circumstances of Defendants' disclosure. Defendants had already made sworn representations to Plaintiff, and to the Court, that they had searched for and been unable to locate the video. If Defendants truly believed the video was so crucial for Plaintiff's case that they believed they needed to suppress it, there is no discernable reason for them to reveal the video to Plaintiff at the time they did, well in advance of trial or any dispositive motions, but after they had already made misrepresentations to the Court.
*5 Plaintiff's main argument for why Defendants had motivation to delay is that Defendants waited until after he could no longer amend his complaint with the video evidence. Dkt. 206 at 2. However, this argument is not persuasive for at least three reasons. For one, it would be unnecessary and inappropriate for Plaintiff to amend his complaint to explicitly include video evidence he obtained during discovery. Complaints are not the appropriate vehicle to submit actual evidence to the Court for consideration of its merits. Complaints simply shape the scope of discovery and trial by naming the defendants, identifying the claims, and describing the allegations to be proved after discovery, either at summary judgment or at trial. To the extent evidence uncovered during discovery supports the allegations Plaintiff made in his complaints, he will be able to submit it on summary judgment or at trial without amending his complaint to actually include the evidence. Second, to the extent the video evidence would prompt Plaintiff to add new defendants and claims to the complaint that he was not aware of prior to filing the complaint, it would not necessarily have been too late for him to do so, as the Court would allow any amendments supported by good cause. See Fed. R. of Civ. P. 16. Defendants would presumably be aware of this common procedural rule, and therefore would likely not actually believe a delay would result in Petitioner being unable to amend his complaint—particularly if that delay was caused by Defendants' misconduct. Third and finally, Plaintiff's putative request for leave to amend would likely be futile. Indeed, the Court already ruled on Plaintiff's motion to amend, which Petitioner filed after Defendants produced the Itani video; the Court found that most of the amendments Plaintiff sought to add were either unrelated to the allegations in the complaint, or consisted of information that Plaintiff should have known at the time of filing. See Dkt. 121. Plaintiff has not described with particularity his proposed amendments, and thus the Court cannot determine whether his amendments differ from the ones the Court already rejected in its prior order. To the extent Plaintiff would seek to add claims or defendants that are unrelated to the incident at issue here, the Court would deny them for the same reasons described in its prior order, regardless of the content of the Itani video. Again, the Court emphasizes that, to the extent the Itani video is relevant to Plaintiff's claims in the operative complaint, the video may be properly submitted as evidence at summary judgment or at trial.
Ultimately, the Court finds that Defendants have shown that the delay in producing the Sgt. Itani video was substantially justified. Furthermore, even assuming the delay was not substantially justified, the Court would conclude the delay was harmless for many of the same reasons listed above. Again, importantly, the video was produced to Plaintiff long before trial or any dispositive motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff has had, and will have, ample opportunity to address the video, whether as a proponent or opponent.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff has suffered any prejudice, it is unclear what sanction would even be appropriate to cure it. The Court notes that, as a pro se litigant, Plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees and expenses under Rule 37 without identifying specific costs, which he has not done. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Blackstone, No. CV 18-966-JVS(E), 2020 WL 8515207, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2020) (“Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, cannot obtain monetary sanctions under Rule 37(b), and Plaintiff has not demonstrated he incurred any costs in connection with the matter”) (citing Brown v. Stroud, No. C-08-02348-JSW (DMR), 2012 WL 2709058, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (pro se party cannot obtain monetary sanctions under Rule 37(b)); Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc., 284 F.3d 1365, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Rule 37 does not empower the district court to award attorney fees to a pro se plaintiff”; “[w]e do not believe the Ninth Circuit, which had not ruled on the issue, would conclude otherwise....”); Bird v. Mayhew, No. 1:15-CV-00298-LJO-SAB (PC), 2016 WL 374555, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (on motion to compel, pro se prisoner plaintiff not entitled to attorney's fees or costs when he had not shown he incurred any costs)). Nor would any of the remedies that would seek to induce compliance with a court order—such as a finding of contempt—be appropriate, given that Defendants have already produced the evidence at issue. Placing aside monetary and contempt sanctions, the only possible sanctions available under Rule 37 are either exclusionary sanctions or terminating sanctions. The Court assumes that Plaintiff would not want the video excluded, as he appears to believe the video is favorable to his case. Finally, for the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing of bad faith to warrant the drastic remedy of terminating sanctions. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting “[a] terminating sanction, whether default judgment against a defendant or dismissal of a plaintiff's action, is very severe...Only ‘willfulness, bad faith, and fault’ justify terminating sanctions.”).
To summarize, the delay in producing the Sgt. Itani video has not resulted in any disruption of trial or dispositive motions, has not caused any obvious uncurable prejudice to Plaintiff, and appears to have been attributable to mistake rather than in bad faith. Considering these factors, the Court finds the delay either substantially justified or harmless.
*6 Plaintiff also appears to argue that Defendants delayed in producing other video evidence in this case. See Dkt. 181 at 3–5 (listing many pieces of video evidence that were allegedly not provided to him until May 6, 2024). However, Defendants filed a status report with the Court indicating they had produced all video evidence, except the Sgt. Itani video and the purged items discussed below, by December 8, 2022. See Dkt. 99. The Court is inclined to presume that any discrepancy in the date between Defendants' production and Plaintiff's access can be attributed to the well-documented issues Plaintiff has had with viewing the video evidence at the facility. However, in any case, Plaintiff appears to admit he saw all the video evidence by May 6, 2024. This was over one year ago, and the Court has since ordered the prison to allow Plaintiff to view the video evidence and granted Plaintiff several extensions to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, the Court would conclude this delay was harmless.
For the reasons described above, Plaintiff's request for sanctions related to any delay in Defendants producing video evidence is DENIED.
2. Alleged failure to preserve video evidence
a. Applicable law
A party has a duty to “preserve evidence it knows or should know is relevant to a claim or defense of any party, or that may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.” Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 104 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1051 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002)). “The common law imposes the obligation to preserve evidence from the moment that litigation is reasonably anticipated.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted). This duty extends to that “period before litigation when a party should reasonably know that evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.” Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Once the duty to preserve takes effect, a party must “suspend any existing policies related to deleting or destroying files and preserve all relevant documents related to the litigation.” In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted).
The party moving for sanctions based on spoliation of evidence must establish the following elements: “(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a ‘culpable state of mind’; and (3) that the evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 604, 626 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Apple, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. The standard of proof for spoliation in the Ninth Circuit “appears to be by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ramos v. Swatzell, Case No. ED CV 12-1089-BRO (SPx), 2017 WL 2857253, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2017); see also Compass Bank, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 1053.
With respect to the remedy for the failure to preserve electronically stored evidence, Rule 37(e) states as follows:
If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
*7 (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
b. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that Defendants intentionally destroyed two pieces of video evidence: (1) mounted footage of video being transported through the sky bridge between Men's Central Jail and the Twin Towers facility; and (2) video of Plaintiff's back brace being taken off at Men's Central Jail. Dkt. 181. Again, the parties appear to be in agreement on certain key facts: that Defendants likely possessed this video evidence, but that the video was deleted pursuant to Defendants' video retention policy, which instructs that video footage is automatically purged after twelve months if Defendants are not explicitly instructed to preserve it for litigation. The Court should note that Defendants have produced several pieces of video discovery to Plaintiff throughout the litigation, including handheld video footage capturing the Plaintiff's transfer through the sky bridge. See Dkt. 99.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a party generally does not engage in spoliation of evidence if it is destroyed in the normal course of its business “without notice of the evidence's potential relevance.” United States v. $40,955.00 in U.S. Currency, 554 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2009). However, once a party should be aware that litigation is reasonably foreseeable, there is a duty to suspend policies that mandate automatic deletion so that the party can retain all relevant documents and information for possible litigation. See Apple, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (finding that emails which were deleted due to a company-wide policy which automatically deleted emails after 14 days was not a valid excuse because the party was on notice that litigation was reasonably foreseeable and that those documents were relevant to the litigation).
Several district courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied these principles in the specific context of prison retention policies. In Sanders v. Los Angeles Cnty., the court described numerous examples:
In Voskanyan v. Unknown, the court found no duty to preserve when a prisoner requested video footage that had been deleted automatically due to the same retention policy as the policy in this case. Voskanyan v. Unknown, No. 2:15-CV-06259-MWF-KES, 2018 WL 6164257, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018). The plaintiff, a prisoner at Men's Central Jail, alleged he was assaulted by 40 inmates and subsequently requested the video recording of that incident. Id. at *2. The complaint was not served out until two years after the events had occurred. Id. at *1. The Sheriff's Department had a video retention policy of one year, and the video had been automatically deleted prior to the service of the complaint. Id. The court reasoned that there can be no duty to preserve what no longer exists since the video was already destroyed prior to the start of the ligation. Id. The plaintiff tried to show that attached informal complaints should have triggered the duty to preserve, but the court determined that this was insufficient evidence because it was not clear whether the defendants received the informal complaints and if that would trigger a duty to preserve. Id. at *2. The court held that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden and that sanctions should be denied without prejudice. Id.
*8 In other cases, courts have found that the duty to preserve was triggered earlier, before the filing of the lawsuit. In Oppenheimer v. City of La Habra, the court found a duty to preserve email and text messages subsequent to a prisoner's suicide at La Habra city jail. Case No. SACV 16-0018 JVS (DFMx), 2017 WL 1807596, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017). The defendants had a policy of automatically deleting emails after 180 days, and thus the relevant emails had been deleted. Id. The complaint was filed January 6, 2016, but the duty to preserve was found by the court to have started around April 20, 2015. Id. at *10. The plaintiff had served the city with a written request for information on April 20, 2015, filed an administrative claim on April 20, 2015, and the defendants already had an open investigation into the decedent's death by that date. Id.
In Mizzoni v. Nevada, the court found a duty to preserve video evidence related to a claim brought by a prisoner in which the defendants allegedly used excessive force and falsified a disciplinary report. Case No. 15-CV-00499-MMD-WGC, 2017 WL 4284597, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2017). The event in question occurred on March 28, 2015, and the prison had a policy of destroying video footage every 10-14 days unless there was an incident. Id. The court held that because the plaintiff had specifically asked for the video footage from the Warden on April 5, 2015, the video footage should have been preserved. Id.
Similarly, in Pettit v. Smith, the court found a duty to preserve video evidence related to an excessive force claim brought by a prisoner. 45 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1108 (D. Ariz. 2014). The plaintiff submitted a grievance letter the same night of the incident, April 16, 2011, to one of the defendants. Id. at 1107. The defendants argued that this would not trigger a duty to preserve because the grievance letter had not yet been screened by the prison. Id. The court rejected this argument and found that the letter did trigger a duty to preserve the relevant video footage because the incident itself was “sufficiently concern[ing]” and the letter underscored that litigation was likely. Id. at 1108.
Sanders v. Los Angeles Cnty., No. CV 15-00907-AG (RAO), 2019 WL 12831725, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019).
In Sanders, the defendant argued that their duty to preserve did not begin until the plaintiff served them with a complaint, at which time the video footage that plaintiff sought had already been deleted. Id. at *3. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was on notice a few weeks after the incident because he had complained about his treatment to the corporate officers and County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors. Id. The Court found that the case was distinguishable from Oppenheimer, Mizzoni, or Pettit because, unlike the plaintiff in those cases, the plaintiff in Sanders had not provided sufficient evidence to support his assertion that the defendant was on notice of his claims. Id. at *5. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that the letter the plaintiff submitted had actually been received by any prison staff. Id.
Similarly here, Defendants argue that they were not on notice of the litigation until they were served with a complaint in this case on July 26, 2021, which was nearly four years after the events at issue, which occurred on December 17 and 18, 2017. Dkt. 183 at 2. Accordingly, the video evidence Plaintiff seeks would have been purged nearly three years prior. However, Plaintiff argues that he filed several grievances in the months immediately following the incident, and thus Defendants should have been on notice of the potential lawsuit. Dkt. 181 at 14. Plaintiff does not attach the actual grievances that he alleges he filed in January 2018, however he attaches a computer printout of unclear origin that appears to indicate the facility received several grievances from Plaintiff in that timeframe. Id. at 54–55. The readout does not go into detail about most of the grievances, and thus it is impossible to tell whether the grievances specifically referenced the events of December 17 and 18, 2017. Id. Plaintiff does submit one grievance form dated May 6, 2018 that describes the incident. Id. at 57. However, the grievance itself does not indicate whether it was received or processed. Id. Notably, this grievance is not included in the readout described above. Id. at 54–55. Plaintiff also submits letters from the facility which Plaintiff alleges are attempts to settle property loss related to the incident, though this is not entirely clear from the content of the letters themselves. Id. at 58–63. However, even assuming these letters relate to the incident at issue, they are all dated over a year after the incident, and therefore the video would have already been purged.
*9 Ultimately, on this record, the Court cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that Defendants were on notice of Plaintiff's claims before the one-year retention period expired. The Court finds this case similar to the Sanders case—while Plaintiff submits some evidence of his attempts to provide notice to Defendants prior to the expiration of the retention period, Plaintiff's evidence is simply not complete enough for the Court to conclude that the Defendants had an obligation to pause their automatic deletion policy. There is simply not direct evidence that Defendants received notice prior to the one-year purge, like there was in Oppenheimer, Mizzoni, and Pettit.
In any case, even assuming that Defendants did have an obligation to preserve the video evidence and failed in that obligation, the Court cannot conclude that they deleted the evidence with the requisite culpable state of mind. As noted above, Defendants have provided a reasonable non-malicious explanation for the deletion in the form of their video retention policy. See Porter v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 16-CV-03771-CW(DMR), 2018 WL 4215602, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018) (finding that the erasure of a phone record pursuant to a two-year retention policy “amounts to gross negligence, not intentional malfeasance”); Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd., 20-7182, 605 F. Supp. 3d 218, 1237-39 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (finding that a failure to halt the automatic deletion process of relevant records was not intentional where the movant had not shown intent to be “the most likely explanation” when negligence was equally probable); Gelazela v. Santa Ana Police Dep't, No. SACV 21-1126-HDV (DFM), 2024 WL 1136338, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2024) (“City Defendants' alleged failure to halt their automatic deletion process, without more, does not rise to a reasonable inference of intent.”). Furthermore, Defendants have provided several other pieces of video evidence from the incident, including handheld video evidence of the tunnel transfer that Plaintiff seeks the mounted video footage for. If Defendants meant to intentionally destroy the mounted tunnel footage because it was favorable to Plaintiff and hide this fact from Plaintiff and the Court, it would make no sense for them to produce footage of the same events in different form.
For similar reasons, the Court cannot conclude that, even if Defendants acted with the culpable state of mind, Plaintiff would be entitled to a favorable inference as described by Rule 37(e).[1] With respect to the tunnel transfer, it appears undisputed that Plaintiff has footage of the transfer from a different source, and Plaintiff has not identified what the mounted footage would show differently. With respect to the removal of the back brace, the general events are confirmed in his medical records, and Plaintiff has provided no evidence that this video would have captured some other critical, but disputed, fact in this case. Under these circumstances, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff is entitled to exclusionary sanctions for spoliation. See Belden v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-CV-00900-RGK (KK), 2020 WL 8515014, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2020) (holding, in the context of a claim alleging inadequate medical care, that even if the defendants acted with culpable state of mind, plaintiffs was not entitled to favorable inference because the plaintiffs had not claimed the evidence would demonstrate the plaintiff was in medical distress during the dates in dispute). Ultimately, either because Defendants did not have an obligation to preserve the evidence, because they did not destroy the evidence with a culpable state of mind, or because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged how the video would have been favorable to his case, Plaintiff's request for spoliation sanctions is DENIED.
B. REQUESTS FOR ORDER PREVENTING FURTHER TAMPERING WITH LEGAL MAIL
*10 Plaintiff appears to seek an order preventing prison staff from interfering with his legal mail. As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff seeks generally “to preclude prison officials from violating [ ] constitutional rights, they are already legally obligated to refrain from such violations.” Jackson v. Walker, No. CIV S 06-2023-WBS GGH, 2007 WL 3173021, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 4287403 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007) (denying request for temporary restraining order and emergency preliminary injunction where plaintiff sought an order “prohibiting harassment reprisals, and constitutional violations”). The Court notes that, while California law dictates that his legal mail is confidential, the prison is legally entitled to inspect his legal mail for contraband. See also Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center, 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017).
In any case, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against prison staff who are not defendants in this action; as a result, the Court currently has no jurisdiction to order injunctive relief against them. See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless that defendant has been served with the summons and complaint in accordance with Rule 4); See Hussain v. Ponce, No. CV 18-6579-JFW (RAO), 2019 WL 1055235, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019) (explaining that the court lacked the authority to issue injunctive relief because the court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, who had not yet been served).
Ultimately, the Court either lacks jurisdiction to order the relief Plaintiff seeks, or else the prison staff are already legally obligated from refraining from the behavior Plaintiff alleges. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for an order preventing further tampering with legal mail is DENIED. If Plaintiff believes his constitutional rights have been violated as a result of tampering with his legal mail, he may raise these allegations in a separate complaint, naming the correct defendants.
C. WHETHER A PROTECTIVE ORDER/UNSEALING IS NECESSARY FOR PLAINTIFF'S SEARCH FOR COUNSEL
1. Applicable law
In the absence of a court order to the contrary, “the fruits of pretrial discovery are ... presumptively public.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.–N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, a court may for good cause enter a protective order under Rule 26(c) to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). Notably, the required threshold showing of specific harm cannot properly consist of “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning.” See Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). Ultimately, if “good cause” is shown, a court will “[balance] the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. To balance the public and private interests, courts consider the following factors:
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and (7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.
*11 In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 417, 424, n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The district courts have broad discretion “to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)). Indeed, “the unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.” Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36.
2. Analysis
Here, Plaintiff wishes to be able to share the video discovery in Defendants' possession with attorneys he is asking to take his case. As the Court previously ruled, Plaintiff must be allowed to do this. See Dkt. 169. However, Defendants ask that any putative attorney first sign an agreement to be subject to the Court's stipulated protective order before receiving the video discovery. They argue that the video depicts Plaintiff unclothed. Dkt. 184 at 5. Furthermore, the videos depict several jail staff that are not parties to this lawsuit, as well as the inside of county jail facilities, including “entry and exit points in secure areas such as the underground tunnel transport.” Id. Notably, the Court granted Defendants' motion to file these videos under seal when Defendants submitted them as exhibits to their motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 139.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants' showing of potential harm is quite bare. Court's routinely hold that the fact that video evidence depicts private persons who are third parts is not alone sufficient to show good cause for a protective order. See, e.g., Christina Astorga v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, et al., No. CV2009805ABAGRX, 2021 WL 5933053, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021) (“Defendants argue that good cause is shown because the videos depict private persons who are third parties. This showing alone is insufficient.”). Indeed, the only specific privacy concerns Defendants identify belong to Plaintiff, who is himself opposing the entry of a protective order. Otherwise, Defendants make only a broad gesture at the fact that the videos depict the inside of county jail facilities and their “entry and exit points.” Dkt. 184 at 5. Looking to the declaration to file exhibits under seal does not yield any more substantive justification, as Defendants broadly assert only that the video “depicts portions of the Men's Central jail and the faces of deputy personnel which present operational and safety concerns.” Dkt. 135 at 2. Defendants make no attempt to explain how this information would lead to specific harm if it were publicly disclosed. Furthermore, as Plaintiff notes, there are apparently publicly available videos on the ACLU and LASD websites that involve far more footage of the inside of jail facilities. See Dkt. 179 at 2, 10–21.
The Court also notes that there is no general protective order in place in this action. Neither party sought such an order even after the Court identified potential privacy interests implicated by the sharing of the video discovery with Plaintiff's putative attorney. Indeed, Defendants acknowledged that there was no protective order in place when they asked the Court to seal their exhibits to their motion for summary judgment, and yet they still did not subsequently seek entry of a protective order. See Dkt. 139. The Court is not inclined to order that any potential attorney be bound by an order that Defendants have not even asked that Plaintiff be bound to.
*12 Ultimately, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to make the requisite threshold showing of good cause for a protective order. In fact, the Court is inclined to unseal exhibit ten to Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on Defendants' bare, general assertion of potential harm. However, the Court will allow the exhibit to remain sealed at least until the Court has an opportunity to view the video.[2]
In any case, the Court acknowledges that Defendants have concerns about simply sending video discovery by mail to any individual identified by Plaintiff, particularly where at least some of the video footage remains under seal. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendants' request for a protective order in part, and fashion a narrow agreement to be signed by any putative attorney before Defendants send the video discovery. The document will be attached at the end of this order for Defendants' use.
D. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
As the Court has already advised Plaintiff, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). In exceptional circumstances, the Court may request that counsel voluntarily represent a civil rights plaintiff, but the Court may not compel an attorney to do so. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). To find exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel, the court must consider at a minimum the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits and the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims “in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Here, given that Plaintiff has not yet survived a dispositive motion the Court does not find that the likelihood of success on the merits, in conjunction with Plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims, warrant the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel is therefore DENIED. In any case, the Court emphasizes that, even if it did find the appointment of counsel was warranted here, the Court has no way to pay counsel requested under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court has declared that ‘the expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only when authorized by Congress.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (no statute provides funds to pay counsel requested under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). Accordingly, even assuming the Court did request counsel on Plaintiff's behalf, counsel would have to agree to take the case on voluntarily, free of charge. Essentially, the Court would just be alerting attorneys to Plaintiff's case. This is not different from what Plaintiff has apparently already been doing himself.
E. REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
As the Court noted in its prior order, given that any amendment would cause significant changes to the Court's scheduling order, and that this case has already been pending for years, any request for amendment must be supported by good cause. See Dkt. 121. For the reasons discussed in subsection II.A.1, as well as those discussed in the Court's prior order, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown good cause. Notably, Plaintiff has not explicitly identified any specific claims or defendants he wishes to add beyond those already allowed by the Court in its prior order. Plaintiff's various filings imply that he wishes to either amend his complaint with video evidence, which is unnecessary, or with claims and defendants unrelated to the incident at dispute in this action, which is improper. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for leave to amend is DENIED. Plaintiff may file a new complaint to bring claims that are unrelated to the incident at issue in this action.
III.
ORDER
*13 Based on the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that Plaintiff's various requests in Dkts. 161, 166, 175, 179, 206 are, for the most part, DENIED. However, the Court will not require that Plaintiff or any putative attorney sign the Court's stipulated protective order before viewing the video discovery in this action. Instead, Defendants should send the narrow agreement described below, and release the discovery upon receiving a signed agreement.
As noted above, the Court previously stayed Defendants motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 131, until the instant sanctions motions were resolved. While Plaintiff has filed several documents that could be construed as oppositions, he appears to maintain that he has not filed his proper opposition to Defendants' motion. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff a final extension of time to file his opposition. This opposition will replace Plaintiff's previous “oppositions.” Plaintiff should include any and all arguments and evidence he wishes the Court to consider and should not presume the Court is considering prior filings. Plaintiff has represented that he is dealing with health issues. Dkt. 206 at 1. Accordingly, the Court will grant him forty-five days, until March 20, 2025, to file his opposition. Further extensions will not be granted absent a particularized showing of good cause.
To aid in Plaintiff's drafting of the opposition, the Clerk is instructed to mail Plaintiff a copy of Defendants' motion, Dkt. 131, as well as the Court's notice in Dkt. 136. Finally, the facility is ordered to allow Plaintiff to view the video discovery at least twice in the next forty-five days. The Clerk of Court is directed to provide a copy of this Order to Chloe Monohan, the prison litigation representative at High Desert State Prison, at P.O. Box 750, Susanville, CA 96127-0750.
IT IS SO ORDERED.


ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND
I, _______ [print or type full name], of _______ [print or type full address], acknowledge that the confidential discovery provided to me by _______ is for the sole purpose of determining whether to accept Bobby Nava as my client in Case No. 2:20-cv-9045-AB (MAR), pending in the Central District of California. I solemnly promise that I will not disclose in any manner any information or item that was provided to me, and, if I decline to accept Bobby Nava in this action, I will promptly destroy the files. If I accept Bobby Nava as a client in this action, I am subject only to any protective orders issued by the Court.
Date: _______
City and State where signed: _______
Printed name: _______
Signature:


Footnotes

To the extent that Plaintiff would argue he is entitled to a different form of sanction, there is realistically no other sanction available to Plaintiff here. As noted above, Plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees as a pro se litigant. See subsection II.A.1. Furthermore, if Plaintiff is not entitled to a favorable inference as to the destroyed evidence, he is surely not entitled the more severe sanction of default judgment.
The Court notes that the flash drive containing the video provided to the Court via Dkt. 132 does not contain the actual video files, but only compressed versions that will not open on Court computers. The Court requests that Defendants properly resubmit the video files.