Linet Americas, Inc. v. Hill-Rom Holdings, Inc.
Linet Americas, Inc. v. Hill-Rom Holdings, Inc.
2025 WL 889579 (N.D. Ill. 2025)
January 27, 2025
McLaughlin, Daniel, United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
Stryker Corporation filed a motion to quash a subpoena from Hillrom Holdings, Inc. requesting documents to rebut allegations of anticompetitive behavior in the hospital bed market. The court denied Stryker's motion, stating that the scope of a Rule 45 subpoena is as broad as permitted under discovery rules and that non-parties may be subject to reasonable steps to avoid undue burden or expense. The court also found that Chicago was an appropriate place for Stryker to produce the subpoenaed ESI, as the 100-mile rule does not apply in this case.
Additional Decisions
LINET AMERICAS, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
HILL-ROM HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants
v.
HILL-ROM HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants
No. 21 C 6890
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division, EASTERN DIVISION
Filed: January 27, 2025
Counsel
Christopher C. Brewer, Pro Hac Vice, Noreen Verini, Pro Hac Vice, Ryan Patrick Phair, Samuel J. Thomas, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, Julie B. Porter, Salvatore Prescott Porter & Porter PLLC, Evanston, IL, for Plaintiff.Elizabeth P. Papez, Amanda Jenkins Sterling, Pro Hac Vice, Harry R.S. Phillips, Pro Hac Vice, Kristen C. Limarzi, Pro Hac Vice, Melanie L. Katsur, Pro Hac Vice, Connie Lee, Pro Hac Vice, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, Ben A. Sherwood, Pro Hac Vice, Eric J. Stock, Pro Hac Vice, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York, NY, Caeli A. Higney, Pro Hac Vice, Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas Tyson, Pro Hac Vice, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, CA, Kalia M. Coleman, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, Chicago, IL, Robert M. Andalman, Aronberg Goldgehn Davis & Garmisa, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Hill-Rom Holdings, Inc., Hill-Rom Company, Inc., Hill-Rom Services, Inc.
Brian J. Beck, Haley Giuliano LLP, New York, NY, Eileen Marie Letts, Zuber Lawler LLP, Chicago, IL, Timothy Ray, Maxwell Hansen, Holland & Knight LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Stryker Corp.
McLaughlin, Daniel, United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 This matter comes before the Court on non-party Stryker Corporation's (Stryker's) Motion to Quash May 21, 2024 Subpoena. [235]. For the reasons that follow, Stryker's motion is denied. However, compliance with the May 21, 2024 subpoena is stayed pending resolution of Hill-Rom Holdings, Inc., Hill-Rom Company, Inc., and Hill-Rom Services, Inc. (Hillrom's) related Motion to Compel Discovery from Non-Party Stryker Corporation [181].
BACKGROUND
Linet Americas, Inc.’s (Linet's) suit alleges that Hillrom monopolized and attempted to monopolize the hospital bed market through anticompetitive behavior, in violation of: Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), Section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 14), the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 ILCS 10/3), and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1). [1] at 94-104.[1] Stryker is not a party to this lawsuit, but it is a competitor in the hospital bed market. See, e.g. [209] at 7. Hillrom's May 21, 2024 subpoena (2024 subpoena) requests documents from Stryker that it claims will provide evidence of a highly competitive marketplace, one in which Stryker is successful, in order to rebut Linet's allegations of Hillrom's unlawfully anti-competitive conduct. [184] at 7.
Stryker moved to quash the 2024 subpoena issued by Hillrom. [235]. Hillrom filed its opposition to Stryker's motion, and Stryker replied in support of its request [260][270]. In summary, Stryker argues that Hillrom's subpoena runs afoul of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it calls for the production of documents in Chicago, Illinois, and Stryker's headquarters is more than 100 miles away in Portage, Michigan [236] at 1-2. As a result, Stryker asserts that the subpoena requires compliance beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 45, a party to a civil action may issue a subpoena commanding a non-party “to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(D). The subpoena “must issue from the court where the action is pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2). The rule defines the “place of compliance” as a “place within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(A).
Rule 45(d) provides for the protection of subpoena recipients and delineates circumstances in which the Court may quash a subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3). The permissible bases for a motion to quash include requiring a recipient to comply outside the geographical limits included in Rule 45(c), requiring the disclosure of a protected matter, and subjecting a recipient to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P 45(d)(3)(A)(ii-iv).
“The scope of a Rule 45 subpoena is as broad as what is otherwise permitted under the discovery rules.” Powell v. UHG 1, 23C6389, 2024 WL 4286960, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2024)(citations omitted). Accordingly, the scope of a Rule 45 subpoena allows discovery:
*2 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, ... the parties’ relative access to relevant information, ...the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Non-parties stand in a different posture than parties to the litigation. “[O]btaining information from non-parties via subpoenas is not unlimited—the issuing party must take ‘reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.’ ” Powell, 2024 WL 4286960 at *2 (quoting Rule 45(d)(1)). A subpoena recipient's non-party status is a factor to be considered in evaluating whether the request(s) create an undue burden. Id.
DISCUSSION
On May 21, 2024, Hillrom issued a subpoena to Stryker. [183]-1. The subpoena issued from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the court where this action is pending. It directed Stryker to produce documents at an address in Chicago, Illinois, by June 20, 2024. Id. at 2. Stryker Corporation is headquartered in Portage, Michigan. There is no dispute that Stryker's corporate headquarters is more than 100 miles from Chicago.
Stryker's primary argument is that the plain language of Rule 45 requires the production of documents “within 100 miles” of where Stryker “resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(A). According to Stryker, the corporation is over 100 miles from the address of compliance, and it does not regularly transact business in person in or around Chicago. In short, Stryker's main objection to the 2024 subpoena is that it is facially invalid.
The resolution of this motion is complicated by the litigation of a 2022 subpoena from this case that involved the same entities. The 2022 subpoena—issued from Hillrom to Stryker—listed the place of compliance for the production of documents as Kalamazoo, Michigan [209]-8 at 4. Hillrom moved to compel compliance with the 2022 subpoena in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. 23-MC-064, W.D. Mich. [1]. That motion was denied without prejudice, based on the fact that the District Judge in this case had not yet ruled on Hillrom's Rule 12 motion. Id. at [21].
Here, where the parties to the underlying dispute have agreed to limit discovery pending a decision on a Rule 12(c) motion that has the potential to focus the scope of the discovery inquiry, it would be inconsistent with Rule 45 to allow discovery to go forward as to a third party, where the decision of the district court in the Northern District of Illinois may well define the appropriate contours of third-party discovery....
Hillrom's motion [to compel] is, therefore, denied without prejudice. Hillrom may re-file its motion after a decision is filed on its Rule 12(c) motion in the Linet suit [this case]....
23-MC-064, W.D. Mich., [21] at 3-4.
On January 17, 2024, the District Judge in the Northern District of Illinois denied Hillrom's Rule 12 motion. [114]. Hillrom did not re-file its motion to compel in the Western District of Michigan. Instead, Hillrom issued the May 21, 2024 subpoena that is the subject of this Order and which directed compliance in Chicago rather than Kalamazoo. Hillrom also seeks to compel compliance with the 2024 subpoena in the Northern District of Illinois, rather than the Western District of Michigan.[2]
*3 Stryker initially moved to quash the 2024 subpoena in the Western District of Michigan. [236] at 5; 23-MC-064, W.D. Mich. [25]. That court denied Stryker's motion without prejudice after concluding that the “only way to way to determine whether a subpoena violates Rule 45(c) is to receive argument or evidence from a subpoenaed party, which requires exercising jurisdiction over the motion.” 23-MC-064, W.D. Mich. [39] at 3-4 (quoting Copeland v. C.A.A.I.R., Inc., No. 17-C-564, 2024 WL 841215, *4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 28, 2024)). The Michigan court continued:
[T]he parties dispute whether Stryker may be required to produce documents in the Northern District of Illinois under Rule 45(c). That court is clearly the proper court to answer that question based on place of compliance in the subpoena, and if it sides with Hill-Rom, it may decide the substantive issues.
23-MC-064, W.D. Mich. [39] at 4.
This Court agrees and adopts in full the reasoning of its sister court in the Western District of Michigan.
I. Chicago is an appropriate place for Stryker to produce subpoenaed materials.
Stryker's corporate headquarters is in Portage, Michigan, which is more than 100 miles from Chicago, the place of compliance listed in the 2024 subpoena.[3] In its motion to quash, Stryker argues that it is not employed, nor does it transact business in or within 100 miles of Chicago, in person or otherwise. [236] at 8. As a result, Stryker urges the Court to find the 2024 subpoena facially invalid in that it seeks compliance outside the geographic boundaries set by Rule 45(c)(2). The simplicity of Stryker's argument is appealing, but it fails for several reasons.
Many federal courts nationwide have confirmed that Rule 45(c)’s 100-mile rule does not apply to a subpoena that seeks only documents and data that can be produced electronically (and does not require travel or in-person attendance of any witness). See, e.g., Curtis v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 17C1076, 2018 WL 2976432, *2 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2018)(“The subpoena at issue does not require the travel or attendance of any witnesses and Plaintiff is requesting the production of electronic documents. This Court finds there is not a violation of the 100-mile limitation for electronic documents.”); CresCom Bank v. Terry, 269 F. Supp. 3d 708, 713 (D.S.C. 2017)(the 100-mile boundary in Rule 45(c)(2)(A) does not apply when the request for documents is not accompanied by a request that a person appear at the place of compliance); Elsom v. Global Life & Accident Ins. Co.,17C407, 2018 WL 4092020, *2 (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2018)(“[C]ases from this circuit and others...have held that Rule 45(c)(2)(A)’s 100-mile boundary does not apply where, as here, the subpoenaed person is not instructed to also appear at the production location along with the requested documents.”); Wahoo Int'l Inc. v. Phix Doctor, Inc., 13C1395, 2014 WL 3573400, *4 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2014)(“Although the challenged subpoenas seek production of documents at a designated location in San Diego, California, the subpoenas do not require any travel by third parties. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant's challenge to the validity of the subpoenas on the ground that they require compliance beyond the geographical limits specified in FRCP 45 is without merit.”).
*4 Here, Hillrom seeks the production of 22 categories of documents and materials. [183]-1 at 12-17. That production does not anticipate or necessitate that a corporate representative travel from Portage to Chicago. The documents can, and are expected to be, produced electronically. Stryker's argument that the 2024 subpoena is invalidated by the distance between its corporate headquarters and the subpoena's place of compliance therefore fails, and to the extent its motion relies on this argument, it is denied.
II. Stryker regularly transacts business within 100 miles of Chicago.
The Court would reach the same conclusion, independent of the analysis above, because Stryker conducts business within 100 miles of Chicago. Rule 45(c)(2) allows a non-party to be subpoenaed to produce documents and electronically stored information within 100 miles of where the subpoena's recipient “regularly transacts business in person.” Rule 45(c)(2). Stryker does business in and around Chicago; it is appropriate for it to be subpoenaed to produce documents in Chicago.
As an example, the Court notes that several Stryker invoices were filed under seal as exhibits to Hillrom's motion to compel compliance with the 2024 subpoena. [181]; [185]-4. Those invoices are for products Stryker sold to several hospitals located in the Chicagoland area, all of which are within 100 miles of Chicago. The invoice lists the seller's contact information as “Stryker Medical,” with an address of 190 Romence Road Parkway, Portage, Michigan 49002. [185]-4 at 2-44. Stryker lists the Romence Road address under the “Worldwide headquarters” heading on its corporate webpage.[4]
In addition, the invoices direct customers to pay the “Stryker Sales Corporation” at a Chicago address. [185]-4 at 2-44. For its part, Stryker argues that principals of corporate identity render these facts meaningless; Stryker Corporation's subsidiaries and affiliates do business in Chicago, but that has no significance to the question of whether Stryker Corporation regularly transacts business within 100 miles of Chicago. See, e.g., [270] at 5-6. Again, the simplicity of Stryker's argument is attractive, but it does not match up with the facts: Stryker issues invoices to customers in the Chicagoland area that include its corporate headquarters and website as its contact information, and direct payment to a separate, Chicago address. See, e.g., [185]-4 at 42. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that Stryker Corporation regularly transacts business “in person” within 100 miles of Chicago.
But there is more evidence that supports this conclusion. Stryker's website allows visitors to search for job opportunities. A search for open positions within 100 miles of Chicago yields 36 open positions (as of 1/16/25), including positions in Chicago, Elk Grove Village, and Cary, Illinois, Crown Point and South Bend, Indiana, and Beloit and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[5] While Stryker may argue that these positions are with subsidiaries, it is not clear from the corporate website that this is the case, and the same corporate website directs applicants to apply and provides the link to do so. These jobs, combined with Stryker's physical locations (in Wood Dale and Cary, Illinois, among other places) provide further support for the conclusion that Stryker Corporation does business in person within 100 miles of Chicago.
*5 In Velocity Patent LLC v. FCA US LLC, 13C8419, 2017 WL 11893112, **3-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2017), the court was confronted with a Rule 45 subpoena seeking document production from Bosch, a non-party, limited liability company based in Lansing, Michigan. The challenged subpoena sought compliance in Chicago, which is over 200 miles from Lansing. The court considered evidence that Bosch was a large, multinational company with many subsidiaries, physical locations, and employees. 13-C-8419, N.D. Ill., [187]-1, [187]-2. The court found that Bosch had a facility in Broadview, Illinois, less than 100 miles from the subpoeana's place of compliance, and employees in the Chicagoland area. Even though Bosch argued that the subpoenaed documents were housed in Lansing, Michigan, the court ordered production in Chicago (as directed by the subpoena) because of Bosch's presence and business in the Chicagoland area. The fact that the subpoenaed documents and materials were stored in Michigan did not render the subpoena unenforceable. Velocity Patent, LLC, 2017 WL 11893112 at *4.
Stryker's motion presents an analogous situation. Stryker is a large, multinational corporation.[6] It directs Chicago-area customers to make contact with corporate headquarters and posts jobs on its corporate website and allows for applicants to submit materials, all for positions that are in and around the Chicagoland area, many at facilities that are within 100 miles of Chicago. The only reasonable conclusion is that, for the purposes of complying with a Rule 45 subpoena, Stryker Corporation regularly transacts business in person within 100 miles of Chicago. This analysis provides an independent basis to deny those portions of Stryker's motion to quash that rely upon the geographical limitations of Rule 45(c). Rule 45(c)(2), (d)(3)(A)(ii).
III. Stryker's inconsistent response to nearly identical subpoenas undercuts its position.
Stryker's motion and its memorandum in support of that motion overwhelmingly focus on the geographic limitations of Rule 45(c)(2). [235], [236]. As the movant, Stryker bears the burden of persuasion to establish the impropriety of the subpoena it challenges. Architectural Iron Workers’ Loc. No. 63 Welfare Fund v. Legna Installers Inc., No. 22C5757, 2023 WL 2974083, *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2023).
Here, its efforts to carry that burden are undercut by the inconsistent manner in which it responded to near-identical subpoenas. [183]-1; [183]-19. Like Hillrom, Linet issued a subpoena to Stryker Corporation. Like Hillrom, Linet directed Stryker to produce documents in the Chicagoland area. In Linet's case, Stryker was directed to produce documents to a law office in Evanston, Illinois, more than 100 miles[7] from Stryker's corporate headquarters in Portage, Michigan. Linet's subpoena was served on Stryker on May 17, 2024. [183]-19 at 2. Hillrom's subpoena came four days later, on May 21, 2024. [183]-1 at 2.
Stryker did not move to quash Linet's subpoena, despite the fact it presented the exact same purported deficiencies that Stryker has challenged, at great length, in the litigation of its motion to quash and in its opposition to Hillrom's motion to compel compliance with the 2024 subpoena. [209], [235], [236], [270]. While it is certainly possible there are reasons why Stryker has chosen to respond in an inconsistent fashion, the discrepancy casts doubt about the extent to which Stryker is inconvenienced by producing documents in Chicago.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stryker's Motion [235] is denied. However, compliance with the 2024 subpoena is stayed pending resolution of the related Motion to Compel [181].
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
The Court follows the page numbers from the CM/ECF header, rather than the numbers assigned by the author of a given document.
Hillrom's Motion to Compel Discovery from Non-Party Stryker Corporation [181] is fully briefed and will be the subject of a separate Order. The issues presented in that motion and Stryker's Motion to Quash May 21, 2024 Subpoena [235] are overlapping. This Order will be incorporated by reference into the Court's Order on Hillrom's motion to compel [181].
According to Stryker's website, its worldwide corporate headquarters is located at 1941 Stryker Way, Portage MI, 49002. According to Google Maps, there are 147 miles between Stryker's corporate offices and the place of compliance listed on the 2024 subpoena (542 S. Dearborn, Chicago, IL 60605). https://tinyurl.com/39fm8r4j (last visited 1/16/25).
https://www.stryker.com/us/en/about/contact.html (last visited 1/16/25).
https://tinyurl.com/3d32ufre (last visited 1/16/25).
https://www.stryker.com/us/en/about/contact.html (last visited 1/16/25).
Notably, Linet's place of compliance is farther from Portage than Hillrom's; Evanston is approximately 163 miles from Portage, whereas the Chicago address given by Hillrom is 147 miles.