*1 This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion:

I. BACKGROUND.

On April 5, 2019, a Second Amended Complaint was filed that alleged various claims against Defendants Ross Albert, Katzkin Leather, Inc. (“Katzkin Leather”), Clearlight Partners, LLC (“Clearlight”), and Clearlight Partners Management, LLC (“CPM”). Doc. No. 104. The Second Amended Complaint alleges a broad conspiracy to take over the Florida leather restyling market that began in July 2015 when Katzkin Leather and Clearlight solicited Albert to assist them while he was employed by Plaintiff Classic Soft Trim (“CST”). Id. The Second Amended Complaint alleges causes of action against Albert for breach of fiduciary duty/breach of loyalty and violation of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act based on actions taken both before and after he terminated his employment with CST on March 18, 2016. See id. at 20, 33, 69. Upon terminating his employment with CST, Albert became employed by Katzkin Leather. Id. The Second Amended Complaint alleges causes of action against Katzkin Leather, Clearlight, and CPM for violation of the Sherman Act, violation of Ohio's and Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, tortious interference, and violation of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act among other things. Id. On August 13, 2020, the Court dismissed Clearlight and CPM as Defendants, and dismissed the Sherman Act and deceptive and unfair trade practices claims against Katzkin Leather. Doc. No. 347. Plaintiffs’ tort claims against Katzkin Leather remain.

On August 7, 2020, Albert filed a Motion to Quash or Modify Non-Party Subpoenas issued to AT&T and Sprint (the “Motion”). Doc. No. 342. Albert argues that the subpoenas were issued without complying with the notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, that the disclosure of content is prohibited by the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), that the requested information includes private, confidential and privileged information, and that the subpoenas are overly broad.[1] Id.

On August 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion. Doc. No. 353. Plaintiffs argue that Albert waived his objections by not filing timely objections, but provide no additional detail to support this argument.[2] Id. The Motion was filed before compliance under the subpoenas was required. See Doc. No. 342, 342-1. Plaintiffs argue that Albert has been compelled to provide the content of text messages to them, so that he can no longer oppose the subpoenas, and that the SCA does not protect third party data. Id.

*2 On August 25, 2020, Albert filed a “Notice of Compromise” indicating that he had agreed to obtain and deliver the responsive phone records as required by this Court's order granting Plaintiffs’ earlier Motion to Compel thereby mooting the issues raised in the Motion and asking that the carriers deliver the subpoenaed records directly to Albert.[3] Doc. No. 357; see Doc. No. 350. On August 26, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response to the Notice of Compromise contesting that any compromise was reached. Doc. No. 357.

The subpoena to Sprint seeks “[A]ll DOCUMENTS ... from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, including but not limited to text logs, data logs, and cell site information” related to telephone number 407-466-8294 concerning: 1) incoming or outgoing calls; 2) incoming or outgoing text messages; and 3) any transactional records. Doc. No. 342 at 2. The subpoena to AT&T seeks “[A]ll DOCUMENTS ... from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, including but not limited to text logs, data logs, and cell site information” related to telephone numbers 407-466-8294 and 407-748-0132 concerning: 1) incoming or outgoing calls; 2) incoming or outgoing text messages; and 3) any transactional records. Id. at 3.

II. APPLICABLE LAW.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, parties may command non-parties to produce “documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person's possession, custody, or control for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” In re: Subpoena Upon NeJame Law, P.A., No. 6:16-MC-8-ORL-41TBS, 2016 WL 1599831, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(D)). “The scope of discovery under a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.” Woods v. On Baldwin Pond, LLC, No. 6:13-CV-726-ORL-19DAB, 2014 WL 12625078, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2014). Rule 26(b)(1) governs the scope of permissible discovery, stating that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1). Moreover, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) requires the Court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2)(C).

“Numerous courts ... have held that parties have a personal interest in their financial and telephone records sufficient to confer standing to challenge a subpoena directed to a third-party.” Mancuso v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., No. 09-61984-CIV, 2011 WL 310726, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2011); Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, No. 12-80577-CIV, 2016 WL 720967, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016) (finding that party had standing to challenge subpoena to his telephone carrier). Pursuant to Rule 45, a Court may quash a subpoena if it (1) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (2) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (3) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (4) subjects a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv). The party seeking to quash a subpoena bears the burden of establishing at least one of the requirements articulated under Rule 45(d)(3). Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 8:14-cv-2351, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16641, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015).

III. ANALYSIS.

*3 Albert has standing to challenge the subpoenas issued to his wireless carriers. Keim, 2016 WL 720967, at *2. The information sought from the wireless carriers is relevant and proportional to the case pending against Katzkin Leather and Albert which alleges that Katzkin Leather, through its employees, worked in concert with Albert to take over the Orlando leather restyling market from CST using a local competitor Classic Designs Automotive. Doc. No. 104. However, the SCA precludes disclosure of any content from text messages or other electronic communications related to the wireless accounts in this instance.

The SCA generally prohibits “ ‘providers’ of communication services from divulging private communications to certain entities and/or individuals.” Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008). Wireless carriers such as AT&T and Sprint must comply with the rules applicable to electronic communication services under the SCA and “shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service,” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), unless one of the specifically enumerated exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) apply. Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2012). The relevant exceptions include: 1) disclosure of the contents of a communication “to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient”; and 2) disclosure of the contents of a communication “with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication.” Id. § 2702(b)(1) and (2). “The SCA does not contain an exception for civil discovery subpoenas.” Mintz, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Hawn v. Vitas Hospice Servs. LLC, No. 1:19-cv-220, 2020 WL 5230713, at *4, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2020). While this means that a provider may not disclose the content of electronic communications pursuant to a civil subpoena unless one of the exceptions enumerated in § 2702 applies, a provider may disclose subscriber information and other metadata from an account.[4] Mintz, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 994. Further, the SCA does not prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining content by serving a request for production of documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 on Albert. Id. (citing Juror Number One v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 854, 865, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151 (2012) (holding that although the SCA prohibited the court from ordering Facebook to produce copies of a juror's wall postings, the court could order the juror to request the wall postings from Facebook directly)).

Here, documents reflecting the content of Albert's text messages are within his control because he has “the legal right to obtain [these] documents on demand” from AT&T and Sprint. See id. And, in fact, this Court has issued an order compelling Albert to produce that content. Doc. No. 350. As such, the Court will modify the subpoenas to reflect that no content within any of the electronic communications may be disclosed.[5] See Haw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Yoshimura, No. 16-00198, 2017 WL 738554, at *3-4, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22733, at *9-10 (D. Haw. Feb. 17, 2017) (modifying subpoenas to exclude the content of any text messages).

IV. CONCLUSION.

*4 Based on the forgoing, it is ORDERED the Motion (Doc. No. 342) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on September 21, 2020.