*1 This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion:

I. BACKGROUND.

On October 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 389) that was initially denied based on inconsistent forms of relief set forth in the motion. Doc. No. 390. On November 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a revised Motion for Sanctions, which is the subject of this Order, against Defendant Ross Albert and his attorney Courtney Wilson for obstructing discovery by “withholding devices with critical ESI evidence, concealing other relevant evidence, failing to submit existing devices for forensic imaging, refusal to comply with Court orders and perjury by Albert in his deposition and discovery process” (the “Sanctions Motion”). Doc. No. 395. On February 10, 2021, Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Kelly granted in part and denied in part the Sanctions Motion, including an award of attorney's fees (the “Order Granting Attorney's Fees”). Doc. No. 437 at 19-20. The fee award against Albert was imposed pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C), in an amount to be determined. Id. Plaintiffs were directed to file a motion quantifying their attorney's fees related to the Sanctions Motion within fourteen days. Id. at 20.

On February 24, 2021, Defendant Albert filed an objection and appeal of the Order Granting Attorney's Fees. Doc. No. 440. On March 1, 2021, the objection and appeal were denied for failing to comply with the Local Rules. Doc. No. 446. On March 3, 2021, Defendant filed his Corrected Objection and Appeal (the “Objection and Appeal”), arguing that the Order Granting Attorney's Fees was erroneous to the extent that it found that Plaintiffs were entitled to some award of attorney's fees. Doc. No. 448 at 1-2. On March 17, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their response to the Objection and Appeal. Doc. No. 453.

On February 24, 2021, Plaintiffs timely filed their Motion quantifying their attorney's fees related to the Sanction Motion as directed in the Order Granting Attorney's Fees. Doc. Nos. 437, 441. However, on May 14, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion quantifying their attorney's fees without prejudice and directed Plaintiffs to file a renewed motion with more supporting documentation within fourteen days. Doc. No. 466. In compliance with the Court's Order issued on May 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their amended motion for attorney's fees and costs on May 28, 2021. Doc. No. 467. But on September 30, 2021, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiffs’ amended motion due to Defendant Albert's pending Objection and Appeal and directed Plaintiffs to file a renewed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs after the District Judge's ruling. Doc. No. 486.

On February 15, 2022, District Judge Berger overruled the Objection and Appeal and affirmed the Order Granting Attorney's Fees. Doc. Nos. 437, 510. In Judge Berger's order, she stated that “[a]lthough Magistrate Judge Kelly sanctioned Albert for spoliation under Rule 37(e), he specifically awarded attorney's fees against Albert under Rule 37(b)(2)(C).” Doc. No. 510 at 4. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this renewed motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs (the “Renewed Motion”). Doc. No. 513. On March 4, 2022, Defendant Albert filed his response to the Renewed Motion (the “Response”), Doc. No. 522, and the matter is ripe for determination.

II. ANALYSIS.

*2 Motions for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). The order on a motion for attorney's fees must contain a clear and concise explanation of the court's reasoning. Id. The Court uses the familiar lodestar method in determining a reasonable fee award, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 433. The party moving for fees has the burden of establishing that the hourly rates and hours expended are reasonable. Norman v. Housing Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).

“In determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours is ‘reasonable,’ the court is to consider the 12 factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008). The Johnson factors are the following: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee in the community; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and the ability of the attorney; 10) the “undesirability” of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

“[A] reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). In determining if the requested rate is reasonable, the court may rely on its own knowledge and experience. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299-1300, 1303 (“The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”). “The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates,” which must be more than just “the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.” Id. at 1299 (citations omitted). Instead, satisfactory evidence generally includes evidence of the rates charged by lawyers in similar circumstances or opinion evidence of reasonable rates. Id.

As for the hours reasonably expended, counsel must exercise proper “billing judgment” and exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In demonstrating that their hours are reasonable, counsel “should have maintained records to show the time spent on the different claims, and the general subject matter of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. Likewise, a party opposing a fee application should also submit objections and proof that are specific and reasonably precise. ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999). A fee opponent's failure to explain with specificity the hours the opponent views as “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” is generally fatal. Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 125 F.3d 1387 (11th Cir. 1997)). “If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount of hours for which payment is sought, pruning out those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quotations omitted). When a court finds the number of hours billed unreasonably high, a court has two choices: it may review each entry and deduct the unreasonable time, or it may reduce the number of hours by an across-the-board cut. Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350.

*3 Once the lodestar is calculated, the court then decides whether an adjustment is necessary. Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. A downward adjustment “is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful in its efforts.” Id. at 1350-51. The Johnson factors are considered in determining the lodestar and “should not be reconsidered in making either an upward or downward adjustment to the lodestar ....” Id. at 1352.

Plaintiffs seek an award of fees as set forth in this table.

Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of forensic examination fees of $13,470.00.

In Albert's Response to the Renewed Motion, he does not dispute that the requested rates are reasonable. Doc. No. 522. However, Defendant opposes the Motion and requests that the Court impose an across-the-board reduction in the number of hours requested rather than itemized deductions. Id. at 6. “Where fee documentation is voluminous, such as in the instant case, an hour-by-hour review is simply impractical and a waste of judicial resources.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it is sufficient for the court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the reduction.” Id.; see also In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1089 (11th Cir. 2019). “The level of specificity required by district courts is proportional to the specificity of the fee opponent's objections.” In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d at 1089.

Defendant argues that the time submitted by Plaintiffs is “grossly exaggerated,” based on vague block billing and includes time spent on irrelevant tasks. Doc. No. 522 at 1. Defendant provides examples of irrelevant tasks and block billing, such as Attorney Greer billing time spent on initial research on the discovery sanction motions against Albert and Katzkin; Attorney Prado reviewing documents pertaining to Katzkin and Mirko; and Mr. Rapaport's time downloading and reviewing recent filings related to Katzkin. Id. at 8.

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs included time spent drafting Plaintiffs’ first motion for sanctions filed on October 14, 2020, which was denied based on inconsistent forms of requested relief. Id. at 2. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs “did not simply re-file their earlier motion with a specification of the relief sought as the Court permitted. Instead, they filed a substantially different motion including... an additional 60 pages of alleged evidence.” Id. at 12.

Defendant also argues the Court denied the majority of the issues raised in the Sanctions Motion and that Defendant should not pay for time spent on the Plaintiffs’ issues that were unsuccessful. Id. at 2. Defendant contends the reward of fees should be limited to the time spent on the successful Rule 37(b) motion to compel, not the Rule 37(e) spoliation claim and for the time spent over the applicable two-week period when the Sanctions Motion was actually prepared. Id. at 2.

Finally, Defendant argues that the reasonableness of the fees should be measured in comparison to time spent by Defendant's counsel (26.5 hours) in defending the motions. Id. at 2. Defendant does not provide any case law to support this argument and, as such, the Court finds it unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs’ submission and the history of this litigation present a number of issues complicating application of the analytic framework mandated by the case law on fee awards. (1) The motion practice employed to reach a decision on the merits of this discovery/spoliation dispute was protracted and characterized by procedural mis-steps, leading to a surfeit of filings. Not all the problems are attributable to Plaintiffs, but they were contributors. (2) Apart from these issues, Plaintiffs prevailed with respect to only a part of the relief they were requesting. (3) The time records submitted show participation by a large number of timekeepers (inevitably creating some duplication of effort). Despite the occasional participation by more junior attorneys, the hours of senior counsel predominate, even with respect to work not requiring such experience (or billing rate). (4) Certain of Plaintiffs’ time entries are vague or suffer from “block billing.” (5) Finally, given what was at stake and the results of this portion of the proceeding, the overall bill is troublingly high.

*4 These concerns guide the Court's application of Johnson and Bivins. As noted, the mistakes and missteps in the presentation of issues are not all attributable to Plaintiffs’ counsel, but at least some of the claimed time cannot be considered as labor “required” to prosecute the Sanctions Motion. It is not feasible to exclude particular time entries, since some of the mis-spent effort was likely of use in preparing corrected filings. Accordingly, the Court will reduce the dollar amount claimed by 15% across the board.[2]

Routine tasks of reviewing and summarizing discovery do not become more valuable simply because they are performed by an attorney with a higher billing rate. Similarly, it is customary for much of the drafting duties to be performed by less experienced counsel, subject to appropriate guidance and editing by senior counsel. Reviewing the time entries as a whole, the Courts finds that 25 of the hours billed by senior counsel should be allowed only at the $400 per hour rate of the more junior attorneys.

Applying these adjustments produces the following lodestar calculation.

Having determined the compensable hours and reasonable hourly rates, “a downward adjustment to the lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful in its efforts.” Bivins, supra, 548 F.3d at 1350-51. Despite Defendant's attempts to reargue a portion of the merits of the Sanctions Motion and to cast himself as a victim, it is clear that Plaintiffs did obtain relief and are entitled to a fee award (as upheld by the District Judge).

It is also clear that they were not successful as to a good bit of what was asserted in the motion papers.[3] Determining a fitting reduction in the lodestar is an imprecise undertaking, particularly with respect to an individual part of a case (as opposed to the final outcome of litigation). Generally, it is not useful to count claims or arguments and tally which ones went one way or another.[4]

On motions such as this one, the Court looks, rather, to whether the result of the motion afforded significant relief and to what degree it may have altered the relations of the parties in the litigation as a whole. Here, as described in Judge Kelly's order and Judge Berger's affirmance, Plaintiffs will be allowed to offer evidence on the loss of information and were able to obtain forensic examination of devices. They did not prevail on various issues of claimed perjury, scope of requests, prejudice and duty to preserve. How all this will play out at trial is, of course, to be determined. Based on the current record, the Court finds that a 25% reduction of the lodestar is appropriate due to limited success on the motion. $66,127.45 less 25% is $49,595.59.

Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement of the costs $13,470.00, to retain their IT expert Archer Hall related to the work necessary to bring the Sanction Motion. Doc. No. 513. In their Renewed Motion Plaintiffs state that IT expert Brian Chase of Archer Hall was retained and his declaration and supporting ESI conclusions were a critical part of the Sanctions Motion. Id. at 8-9. The bill from Archer Hall is attached as Exhibit “B” to the Renewed Motion and limited to the time period from October 1, 2020, through October 23, 2020. Id. at 27-31. Plaintiffs contend that these costs are limited and are directly related to the extraction and analysis of cell phone and computer ESI necessary in bringing the Sanctions Motion and supporting Mr. Chase's declaration which was submitted as evidence in support of the Sanctions Motion attached as Exhibit 10. Doc. No. 513 at 8.

*5 Defendant baselessly argues the costs incurred by Archer Hall submitted with Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion hold no connection to the Sanctions Motion. Doc. No. 522 at 9. Defendant further fruitlessly argues the supporting affidavit submitted by Mr. Chase “does not make any attempt to connect any of the tasks performed to the subject sanctions motion.” Id. Defendant then provides examples of time entries that are repeated with identical descriptions, several of which Archer Hall states that there is no charge for these tasks. Doc. Nos. 522 at 9-10; 513 at 27-30. The Sanctions Motion expressly relied on Archer Hall's findings throughout the motion and as mentioned previously, Mr. Chase's declaration was attached as Exhibit 10 as supporting evidence. The Court finds Defendant's objections to the costs to be meritless.

III. CONCLUSION.

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Renewed Motion (Doc. No. 513) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on May 17, 2022.