Specter v. Rainbow King Lodge, Inc.
Specter v. Rainbow King Lodge, Inc.
2019 WL 11637305 (D. Alaska 2019)
November 13, 2019
Burgess, Timothy M., United States District Judge
Summary
Plaintiffs have served Recon Air with discovery requests for documents and ESI. Recon Air has responded to the requests, but Plaintiffs have identified deficiencies in the responses. The court will need to determine whether Recon Air has provided sufficient ESI to satisfy Plaintiffs’ discovery requests and whether a protective order is necessary to protect Recon Air from undue burden or expense.
Additional Decisions
JOLYN L. SPECTER, et al, Plaintiffs,
v.
RAINBOW KING LODGE, INC., an Alaska Corporation, et al, Defendants
v.
RAINBOW KING LODGE, INC., an Alaska Corporation, et al, Defendants
Case No. 3:17-cv-00194-TMB
United States District Court, D. Alaska
Signed November 13, 2019
Counsel
Alisa R. Brodkowitz, Schroeter Goldmark Bender, Rachel Min Luke, Friedman Rubin, Seattle, WA, Peter Reed Ehrhardt, Law Office of Peter Ehrhardt, Kenai, AK, for Plaintiffs.Marc Gerhard Wilhelm, Robert L. Richmond, Richmond & Quinn, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant Rainbow King Lodge, Inc.
John B. Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness & Johnson, LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc.
Gary A. Zipkin, Kristin E. Crabb, Guess & Rudd P.C., Anchorage, AK, Robert James Fenn, Pro Hac Vice, Rohmer & Fenn, Richmond Hill, ON, for Defendant Recon Air Corporation.
Burgess, Timothy M., United States District Judge
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT RECON AIR CORPORATION'S THIRD SET OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES (DKT. #120)
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs, Jolyn Specter, David Wood and Marianne Wood's, Motion to Compel Defendant Recon Air Corporation's Discovery Responses (“Motion”).[1] Defendant, Recon Air Corporation (“Recon Air”), opposes the Motion.[2] This matter was fully briefed by the Parties.[3] Oral argument was not requested, nor is it necessary for the Court's determination. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.
II. BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a plane crash that occurred on September 15, 2015, shortly after takeoff from East Wind Lake, Alaska.[4] Plaintiff's decedent, James E. Specter, and Plaintiff, David W. Wood, Jr., were passengers on the plane, a DeHavilland DHC-3 “Otter” aircraft (“subject aircraft”).[5] The plane was owned and operated by Defendant, Rainbow King Lodge, Inc. (“Rainbow King”).[6] In April 2014, Recon Air modified the subject aircraft by installing a kit in the aircraft “known as Stol Kit STC SA00287NY, a Baron Stol Kit manufactured by Stolairus Aviation, Inc ... ” and converting the subject aircraft's piston engine to a turbine engine, among other modifications and repairs.[7]
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Stolairus Aviation (“Stolairus”) “caused the aircraft to crash into the ground” because the STOL Kit “changed the center of gravity, making the center of gravity too far aft and contributing to or causing a stall and or loss of control of the aircraft.”[8] Plaintiffs' Complaint also alleges that “the modification of the aircraft designed and completed by” Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc. (“Texas Turbine”) and Recon Air “also changed the center of gravity of the accident aircraft” and Defendants “failed to inspect, identify and warn of the change in the center of gravity.”[9] Recon Air agrees that it “installed the turbine engine conversion kit [in the subject aircraft] in accordance with the installation drawings and specifications provided by Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc., and in full compliance with applicable laws and regulations.”[10] Plaintiffs bring claims against Recon Air for negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation/breach of warranties, wrongful death, and personal injury.[11]
Previously, and because of a personal jurisdiction dispute regarding Stolairus, the Court ordered discovery “limited to Stolairus' contacts with Alaska having to do with Stolairus' STOL kits” and supplemental briefing with respect to specific jurisdiction over Stolairus.[12] As result of the Court's discovery order, Recon Air began production of documents to Plaintiffs.[13]
*2 Plaintiffs and Recon Air have continued engaging in discovery including exchanging initial disclosures, witness lists, interrogatories, requests for production (“RFP”), requests for admission, and depositions.[14] Specifically, Plaintiffs have propounded three sets of discovery requests, which contain 22 interrogatories, 31 RFPs, and three requests for admission.[15] Plaintiffs do not assert any deficiencies with respect to the first two sets of discovery requests; it appears that Recon Air responded to those requests without incident.[16]
On July 22, 2019, Plaintiffs served their third set of discovery requests on Recon Air to which Recon Air responded on August 26, 2019.[17] On August 30, 2019, Plaintiffs first notified Recon Air that the discovery responses were insufficient. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sought to meet and confer several times over the deficiencies they had identified.[18] Finally, on September 4, 2019, in their last communication regarding the discovery deficiencies, Recon Air emailed the following to Plaintiffs' counsel:
we do wish to supplement our client's responses by adding a relevance objection to all of the interrogatories, all of the requests for production, and all of the requests for admission. Please consider our responses to have been amended to add that objection. Otherwise, our client stands by all of its answers and responses as stated. There is therefore no need to conduct a telephonic meet and confer.[19]
On September 9, 2019, in response to Recon Air's email, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel seeking the Court's intervention to compel responses to five interrogatories, five RFPs, and three requests for admission.[20] Plaintiffs also seek to require Recon Air to bear the costs associated with further depositions if necessary based on Recon Air's supplemental responses.[21] On September 12 and 13, 2019, as previously scheduled, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), Plaintiffs deposed Ron Mercer, Director of Maintenance at Recon Air,[22] and Roy Leuenberger, President of Recon Air,[23] in their representative and individual capacities. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiffs also deposed Kevin Leuenberger, Quality Assurance Manager at Recon Air.[24]
*3 On September 27, 2019, Recon Air responded to Plaintiffs' Motion, arguing that Plaintiffs have wasted valuable time and resources in bringing this Motion because the topics in each of the discovery requests were explored by Plaintiffs during depositions with Recon Air's corporate representatives and employee witnesses.[25] Recon Air also provided specific objections and responses to each discovery request.[26]
In their Reply, Plaintiffs concede that during these depositions they had an opportunity to “obtain some answers” and “some of the discovery requests Plaintiffs moved to compel responses to are now moot.”[27] However, they continue to seek the Court's intervention to compel responses to Interrogatory 18 and RFP 27.[28]
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
One of the requirements of Rule 26 is relevancy. “Relevancy for discovery purposes is construed broadly”[31] but “ ‘[e]ven if evidence is discoverable and relevant under Rules 34, 33, and 26, the Rules contain some express constraints, boundaries both ‘ultimate and necessary,’ on discovery's otherwise sprawling reach.’ ”[32] Specifically, under Rule 26(b)(1), discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case.”[33] “ ‘Rule 26(b) has never been a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and speculative fishing expedition.’ ”[34] Rather, “the parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.”[35]
Generally, a requesting party may move to compel the production of documents from a party that fails to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery.[36] Under Rule 37(a)(3)(B), a party may move to compel discovery if another party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33 or fails to respond to a request for production under Rule 34.[37] In so moving, “[t]he party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its requests satisfy the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).[38] By that same token, “the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.”[39] Here, because Plaintiffs have moved to compel discovery, they bear the burden of showing the relevancy of their requests, while Recon Air—the party resisting discovery—bears the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections to Plaintiffs' requests.
*4 Just as a party seeking discovery may move to compel, Rule 26(c) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”[40] Similar to other discovery rules, “Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”[41] “Under Rule 26(c), the party seeking the protective order must show good cause to preclude or limit the discovery.”[42] To establish good cause, the moving party must “point to specific facts that will support the request” and cannot rely on “conclusory or speculative statements” or a “mere showing that the discovery may involve some inconvenience or expense.”[43]
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court addresses each of Plaintiffs' discovery requests in turn.
A. Interrogatory 18
Plaintiffs ask Recon Air to “[p]lease describe the steps, in sequential order, of the modification of the subject aircraft from a piston aircraft to a turbine aircraft.”[44] Recon Air objects on relevance grounds and because the request would cause it “to spend an inordinate amount of time to regurgitate the sequence of work outlined in the records already produced. Plaintiffs are in the same position as [Recon Air] in terms of creating the requested timeline.”[45]
The Parties agree that Recon Air modified the subject aircraft and specifically installed the turbine engine conversion kit.[46] Plaintiffs claim that this modification caused a shift in the plane's center of gravity, which contributed to or caused a stall and or loss of control of the plane. At the discovery stage, Plaintiffs' interest in greater understanding of how Recon Air carried out the modification of the plane is relevant to their claims. During Ron Mercer's deposition as a representative of Recon Air, he testified that
[t]here is a sequence of events, of jobs that have to be done before other jobs. Whomever Recon Air delegates to be in charge of the aircraft would supervise all the work on the aircraft and delegate the work and proper sequence until the aircraft is completed.”[47]
Mercer also testified that the piston to turbine conversion supplemental type certificate (“STC”) or installation drawings would explain the precise sequence, and that as an installer, Recon Air has an obligation to follow the STC installation instructions.[48]
Given that it was Recon Air, and not Plaintiffs, who installed the turbine conversion kit, Recon Air's response that “Plaintiffs are in the same position as [Recon Air] in terms of creating the requested timeline” is incorrect.[49] Mercer further testified that Recon Air does not currently have any such STC installation drawings.[50] However, that Recon Air does not currently have the drawings does not mean it cannot respond to Interrogatory 18, nor does it render Plaintiffs' request irrelevant. Recon Air cannot avoid cooperating in discovery simply by making a generalized complaint that this request will take up their time. In this Motion, Recon Air bears the burden to support its objections, but has failed to do so.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel as to Interrogatory 18. Recon Air must produce to Plaintiffs a sequence of work, but only with respect to the piston to turbine conversion. Recon Air may do so by relying on documents it already produced, creating a new document demonstrating the sequence, or another method; but it must meaningfully respond to Interrogatory 18.
B. Request for Production 27
*5 With respect to RFP 27, Plaintiffs seek “any and all correspondence with Texas Turbines (sic) regarding flight testing.”[51] Recon Air objects on relevance grounds and because the term “flight testing” is undefined and vague.[52] Recon Air further responds stating it “is aware that Texas Turbine conducted flight testing which was provided to the FAA in support of its STC. See Texas Turbine's production of their flight testing.”[53]
Despite Recon Air's objection, this request is relevant to address Plaintiffs' claim that Recon Air failed to inspect, identify and warn of the change in the center of gravity allegedly caused by their modification. This request seeks the production of communication between Recon Air and Texas Turbine regarding a particular subject. Recon Air's response acknowledging that Texas Turbine has conducted flight testing is non-responsive to the request, which asks for correspondence. Moreover, Recon Air's response does not demonstrate whether it has conducted a search for the correspondence at issue in Plaintiffs' request, and if so, whether any such search was electronic or by paper.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel as to RFP 27. Recon Air must produce to Plaintiffs any correspondence with Texas Turbine regarding flight testing of the subject aircraft. If no such correspondence exists, Recon Air must so state.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion at docket 120 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion as moot with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 19-22, RFP Nos. 28-31 and Requests for Admission Nos. 1-3 because these discovery issues have been resolved by the Parties. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to Interrogatory 18 and RFP 27. Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, Recon Air must supply responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory 18 and RFP 27 in accordance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 13th day of November, 2019.
Footnotes
Dkt. 120 (Motion).
Dkt. 122 (Response in Opposition).
Dkts. 120; 122; 123 (Reply).
Dkt. 1 at 2–3 (Complaint). See also Dkts. 17 at 1–2 (Answer by Texas Turbine); 25 at 2 (Answer by Rainbow King); 28 at 2 (Answer by Recon Air).
Id.
Id. Plaintiffs also initially claimed that the plane was owned and operated by Jacob Sheely, Rodger Glaspey, Ted Sheely, and or Zachary Sheely, officials at Rainbow King, although Plaintiffs have since dismissed their claims against those defendants. See Dkt. 1 at 2–3, 5–6; Dkt. 59 (Notice of Dismissal).
Dkt. 1 at 3–4 (A Stol Kit refers to an airplane modification for “short takeoff and landing”). See also Dkts. 25 at 2; 28 at 2.
Dkt. 1 at 8.
Id.
Dkt. 28 at 8.
Dkt. 1 at 12–20.
Dkt. 70 at 12 (Order Granting in Part Stolairus' Motion to Dismiss based on general jurisdiction and Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue and permitting limited discovery regarding specific jurisdiction).
See Dkt. 80 at 2–3 (Declaration in Support of Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction).
Dkts. 116 (Scheduling and Planning Order), 120, 121-1 (Declaration in Support of Motion to Compel), 122-1 (Correspondence among the Parties regarding an extension of time), 122-2 (Transcript of Deposition of Rob Mercer, Part 1), 122-3 (Transcript of Deposition of Rob Mercer, Part 2), 122-4 (Transcript of Deposition of Kevin Leuenberger), 122-5 (Transcript of Deposition of Roy Leuenberger, Part 1), 122-6 (Transcript of Deposition of Roy Leuenberger, Part 2), 122-7 (Recon Air's Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests).
Dkt. 121-1 at 2–16 (Plaintiffs' Third Set of Discovery Requests), at 21–33 (Recon Air's Responses to Plaintiffs Third Set of Discovery Requests).
Dkt 122-7 (Recon Air's Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Discovery Requests).
Dkt. 121-1.
Id. at 35–48 (Plaintiffs sought to discuss their perceived deficiencies on August 30, September 3, and September 4, 2019).
Id. at 44 (September 4, 2019 e-mail from Gary Zipkin to Alisa Brodkowitz).
Dkt. 120.
Id.
See Dkts. 122-2, 122-3; 122-2 at 5 (Recon Air identified Ron Mercer as a witness to testify regarding the following categories: (1) “any and all modifications that the subject aircraft underwent while at Recon Air Corporation;” and (2) “any and all repairs to the subject aircraft that were made in conjunction with any work performed by Recon Air Corporation.”).
See Dkt. 122-5. Dkt. 122-2 at 5 (Recon Air identified Roy Leuenberger as a witness to testify regarding the following categories: (1) “any and all warranties that are created or conveyed by either Recon Air Corporation and/or Texas Turbine, Inc. as a result of the modifications;” and (2) “any and all test flights that Recon Air Corporation performed of the subject aircraft both before or after the modifications, all test flights that Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc. performed both before or after the modifications and the practice of Recon Air Corporation with respect to test flights of modified aircraft currently, along with communication to anyone regarding test flight of modified aircraft.”)
Dkt. 122-4.
Dkt. 122.
Id.
Dkt. 123 at 2.
Id.
Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). See also Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1047 n.16 (9th Cir. 2016).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Basargin v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:16-cv-00031, 2017 WL 8677339, at *1 (D. Alaska Feb. 21, 2017) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 637, 641 (E.D. Wash. 2011) and Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 427 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1978)).
Id. at *1 (quoting United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 237 (S.D. Cal. 2015) and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Basargin, 2017 WL 8677339, at *1 (quoting Carter, 305 F.R.D. at 237 and Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Grp. Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes to 2015 Amendments, Subdivision (b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (iv).
Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Money Market 1 Institutional Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Louisiana Pacific Corp., 285 F.R.D. at 485.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Basargin, 2017 WL 8677338, at *3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Basargin, 2017 WL 8677338, at *3 (quoting E.E.O.C v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006) and Frideres v. Schlitz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 156 (S.D. Iowa 1993)).
Dkt. 121-1 at 22.
Id. at 22, 44.
Dkts. 1 at 6–7, 28 at 8.
Dkt. 122-3 at 4.
Id. at 1, 4.
Dkt. 121-1 at 22.
Dkt. 122-3 at 4.
Dkt. 121-1 at 26.
Id. at 26, 44.
Id. at 26.