I. Background

This action arises from a vehicular collision involving Grant and Defendant Karl O. Brooks (“Brooks”). On October 19, 2017, Grant was driving on Highway 62 in Orange County, Texas. Brooks, operating an 18-wheeler truck, failed to yield the right of way and, as a result, collided with Grant's vehicle. CRST admits that Brooks was operating the truck in the course and scope of his employment with CRST. Furthermore, CRST stipulated that Brooks's negligence caused the accident and that CRST is vicariously liable for Brooks's injuries under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The remaining issue in this case is the amount of damages Grant is entitled to recover. Grant seeks damages, in relevant part, for his loss of earnings and earning capacity.

Before the collision, Grant worked as a control specialist II for Arlanxeo Performance Elastomers (“Arlanxeo”). On April 2, 2019, Grant was deposed for the first time. In his deposition, he testified that he continued to work in the same position at Arlanxeo after the collision. In November 2019, Grant underwent surgery, performed by Erwin Lo, M.D. (“Dr. Lo”), for injuries he claims he sustained as a result of the collision. On January 3, 2020, Grant had a post-operation appointment with Dr. Lo, where he determined that Grant was able to return to work ten days later, on January 13, 2020, without any restrictions (#237-1).

In January 2020, Grant timely designated Jeffrey Peterson (“Peterson”) as a vocational expert to testify regarding Grant's loss of earnings and earning capacity. In his initial report, dated January 30, 2020, Peterson opined that “[s]hould [Grant's] overall medical condition deteriorate and/or he is unable to meet the expectations of his employer and is subsequently terminated from Arlanxeo, his vocational alternatives and employability will be severely limited, if not totally precluded.” Nevertheless, on June 3, 2020, Grant was seen by Charles Campbell, P.T., at Advanced Therapy Solutions, where he was advised that he could continue to work full time without any restrictions.

Months later, Grant disclosed a supplemental report completed by Peterson, dated August 24, 2020. That report was based on an additional medical assessment conducted by Dr. Lo on August 13, 2020 (#136-6). In the assessment, Dr. Lo opined that Grant's job as a control specialist II was classified as a sedentary or light job and that Grant could not perform either sedentary or light work. As a result of that determination, Peterson's supplemental report advised Grant that, because he is “completely and totally disabled from the workforce,” he “should exit the workforce as soon as possible.” In accordance with that advice, Grant's employment was terminated shortly after Peterson's supplemental report was disclosed.[1] Notably, it is unclear whether his break from Arlanxeo is temporary or permanent.

*2 In response to the changes made in Peterson's supplemental report, CRST was permitted to conduct additional discovery pursuant to the court's order, dated December 16, 2020 (#219). Specifically, in its December 14, 2020, status conference with the parties, the court “reopened discovery on the issue of Grant's loss of earning capacity, allowing CRST to provide a rebuttal expert report and permitting both CRST and Grant to depose the parties' vocational experts” (#218). The court also reopened discovery regarding “the scope and details of Grant's medical providers' factoring arrangement with Access Care” because, without that information, the court was unable to make certain evidentiary rulings. Further, “[d]ue to the reopening of discovery limited to these two issues, the court extended the final pretrial conference and trial dates and ordered the parties to revise their pretrial order.”

On February 4, 2021, CRST served LICNA with a subpoena noticing CRST's intention to take LICNA's deposition by written questions. On February 10, 2021, CRST amended its subpoena, narrowing the records requested (#237-9). The amended subpoena requests that LICNA produce the following:

II. Analysis

Grant seeks to quash the subpoena for LICNA's deposition by written questions on two bases: (1) it seeks records beyond the scope of permissible discovery; and (2) it seeks records outside of the limited scope for which the court reopened discovery. CRST counters that its amended subpoena is narrowly tailored and seeks documents that are relevant to determining whether Grant is temporarily or, rather, permanently disabled—a determination that is imperative to evaluate Grant's claim for loss of earning capacity.

A. Whether the Discovery is Impermissible

Grant asserts that the deposition by written questions is outside of the scope of permissible discovery because CRST's request is overly broad and seeks documents that are irrelevant. Grant also argues that the discovery of the requested documents would violate Grant's family's privacy rights as well as the collateral source rule. The court, however, is unpersuaded.

General, boilerplate, and unsupported objections to discovery requests that fail to state their grounds with specificity are improper and result in waiver of those objections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), advisory committee note (2015) (Rule 26 does not “permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that is not proportional”); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding boilerplate objections that interrogatories were “overly broad, burdensome, and oppressive” were “not adequate to voice a successful objection” and thus not valid); Star Creek Ctr., LLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00607, 2018 WL 1934084, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018) (holding plaintiff “waived several objections by making boilerplate ... objections”); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483-84 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“So-called boilerplate or unsupported objections ... are likewise improper and ineffective and may [amount to] what the Fifth Circuit has described as ... Rambo tactics ....”); Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 159, 164-66 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that boilerplate objections fail “to meet the specificity requirements” of Rule 34 or Rule 26). Objections that are untimely or lack specificity are “waived unless the court, for good cause, excepts the failure.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4); see Enron Corp. Sav. Plan, 258 F.R.D. at 153, n.1 (applying Rule 33 requirements to both interrogatory and document request objections).

*3 Here, Grant has objected to CRST's subpoena to LICNA for its deposition by written questions. Although Grant asserts that the subpoena is overly broad and seeks documents that are irrelevant, he fails to specify the grounds for the objection. Because Grant gives no specific grounds for his objections, Grant's objections are vague, ambiguous, and lacking in the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By failing to explain or support his objections, Grant shirked his burden of explaining his resistance to discovery. As such, Grant's objections to the subpoena as being overly broad and seeking documents that are irrelevant are overruled and are waived.

Grant also maintains that the discovery of the requested documents in the subpoena to LICNA would violate the privacy interests of Grant's family as well as the collateral source rule. To the extent that Grant's family has a privacy interest in the documents produced by LICNA, CRST has made clear that it is amenable to a protective order. The court finds that a protective order would protect the purported privacy interests of Grant's family as non-parties to this suit. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to submit an agreed protective order.

The court further rejects Grant's argument that CRST's subpoena seeks documents that violate the collateral source rule. The collateral source rule “bars a tortfeasor from reducing his liability by the amount plaintiff recovers from independent sources.” Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Davis v. Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1243 (5th Cir. 1994)). The doctrine “ ‘proscribes introduction of evidence of collateral benefits out of a concern that such evidence might prejudice the jury,’ but the rule does not necessarily bar the discovery of such information.” McCutchen v. Olivarri, No. SA-08-CA-48-FB, 2012 WL 13072064, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012) (quoting Davis, 18 F.3d at 1243); see Ochoa v. Mercer Transp. Co., No. 5:17-CV-1005-OLG, 2018 WL 6220155, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2018) (stating that “[t]he collateral source rule ... is a rule of both evidence and damages, but it is not a rule of discovery”). Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) establishes a broad scope of discoverable information and does not require that the requested information be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Ochoa, 2018 WL 6220155, at *1 (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the collateral source rule barred certain discovery, explaining that “the rules governing discovery are clear that information that is relevant to a party's claim or defense ‘need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable’ ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1))). Here, Grant has failed to provide argument or authority that any specific claim for benefits is subject to the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule. See Ochoa, 2018 WL 6220155, at *1; McCutchen, 2012 WL 13072064, at *2. As such, Grant's objection to the subpoena based on the collateral source rule is overruled.

B. Whether the Discovery is Outside of the Court's Limited Reopening of Discovery

Grant further challenges CRST's subpoena for the deposition by written questions of LICNA as being outside of the scope of the court's limited reopening of discovery. As previously explained, the court reopened discovery on the issue of Grant's loss of earning capacity. The court finds that LICNA's records pertaining to any claims for disability benefits submitted by Grant may provide evidence of the status of Grant's purported disability, the extent of which has continued to change post-collision. For this reason, the court finds that the deposition by written questions to LICNA is within the scope of Grant's loss of earning capacity claim and is, therefore, permissible.

III. Conclusion

*4 Based on the foregoing, Grant's Motion to Quash the Deposition by Written Questions of LICNA (#234) is DENIED. It is ordered that the parties shall file an agreed motion for entry of a protective order within 3 days of this order.

SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 19th day of February, 2021.

Grant's employment ended sometime between August 24, 2020, when the supplemental report was disclosed, and December 14, 2020, when Grant's counsel advised the court that Grant no longer worked at Arlanxeo. Notably, on October 9, 2020, Grant told Dr. Lo that he was temporarily off work (#237-7).