*1 This matter is before me on the Motion for Entry of Partial Judgment (ECF No. 129) filed by Defendants Keith Edmonds and Cargill Meat Logistics Solutions, Inc. Defendants request that the Court enter partial judgment for the attorney fees previously awarded against Plaintiff Sean Stenson. I find the law supports entry of partial judgment under these circumstances and therefore grant Defendants’ Motion.

Mr. Stenson's claims in this case arise out of a collision between his vehicle and a semi truck driven by Mr. Edmonds. Mr. Stenson alleges that he was seriously injured due to Mr. Edmonds’ negligent operation of the semi truck. After receiving incomplete medical records and inadequate discovery responses from Mr. Stenson, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel (ECF No. 20). I granted that Motion and ordered Mr. Stenson to provide his financial records and HIPAA releases covering his medical records. Order on Mot. to Compel at 3-4, ECF No. 26. Defendants then filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions (ECF No. 42), alleging that Mr. Stenson had disclosed falsified paychecks to substantiate his pre-collision income. I found Mr. Stenson had engaged in misconduct that “interfered with these proceedings and prejudiced Defendants with undue delay and expense throughout discovery.” See Order on Mot. for Sanctions at 6, ECF No. 71. Consequently, I granted the Motion for Sanctions in part, awarding Defendants the attorney fees they reasonably incurred in prosecuting both their Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A).[1] Id. at 4-5.

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides that, if a motion to compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” The only exceptions to an award of attorney fees are if “(1) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (2) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). In awarding attorney fees against Mr. Stenson, I found that none of those exceptions applied in this case. Order on Mot. for Sanctions at 4-5.

Mr. Stenson offers five reasons why partial judgment should not enter on the attorney-fee award against him. First, he claims that he is not in a financial position to pay the attorney-fee award. Second, he asserts that his presumed recovery in this case can be offset by the attorney fees. Third, he states that he intends to file an appeal regarding the fee award. Fourth, he argues that Tenth Circuit precedent does not require immediate payment of such awards. And, fifth, he notes that since he has been represented by his present counsel, he has followed all court orders. Only one of these arguments is appropriately raised at this juncture: that Tenth Circuit precedent does not require immediate payment of attorney-fee awards. The claims that Mr. Stenson may not be able to pay the award and has followed all court orders while represented by his current counsel should have been established as defenses to the original requests for attorney fees. Regardless, Mr. Stenson still has not presented a compelling case of either claim. The other arguments—that his ultimate recovery can be offset and that he intends to file an appeal—do not prevent entry of the partial judgment and are issues better suited for a motion to stay execution of the judgment once it is entered.

*2 Thus, in ruling on Defendants’ Motion, I focus on Mr. Stenson's contention that immediate payment of discovery-related fee awards is not mandated in the Tenth Circuit. Considering the purpose of such awards and the consequences if immediate payment is not required, I find Mr. Stenson's position is incorrect. The language of Rule 37(a)(5)(A), obliging the court to award fees unless one of the limited exceptions applies, “presses the court to address itself to abusive practices.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment. An award of attorney fees under that provision is meant to deter future misconduct and to help make the wronged party whole. If the party ordered to pay the award is permitted to delay payment until final judgment in the case, there would be little incentive for that party to refrain from engaging in abusive conduct throughout the rest of the litigation. Moreover, cases sometimes last decades, and wronged parties should not be forced to bear the cost of the misconduct over that time. Of course, a stay of payment or execution of the award may be granted by the court, but without such a stay, payment is due immediately or as otherwise ordered by the court.[2] Because the award is immediately enforceable, entry of judgment is not essential. Nevertheless, Defendants have demonstrated that, in this case, the entry of partial judgment is necessary to assist them with execution of the attorney-fee award.

The Motion for Entry of Partial Judgment (ECF No. 129) is therefore GRANTED. In accordance with my prior order awarding attorney fees (ECF No. 125), partial judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants Keith Edmonds and Cargill Meat Logistics Solutions, Inc. and against Plaintiff Sean Stenson in the amount of $95,900.42.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2021.