*1 In this case arising out of a motor vehicle collision, the parties have been embroiled in extensive discovery disputes, many due to Plaintiff Sean Stenson's “failure to produce complete records and his lack of veracity.” 6/25/20 Order at 7, ECF No. 71. On October 15, 2020, I referred the Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 72, the “Fee Application”) filed by Defendants Keith Edmonds and Cargill Meat Logistics Solutions, Inc. to Magistrate Judge Varholak for him to provide a recommendation on the expenses reasonably incurred by Defendants in making their earlier Motion for Attorney Fees and Sanctions (ECF No. 42). Magistrate Judge Varholak has since issued both a Recommendation (ECF No. 114) and a Supplemental Recommendation (ECF No. 118) on the Fee Application. On April 8, 2021, Stenson filed a timely Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Supplemental Recommendation (ECF No. 120). For the reasons set forth below, Stenson's Objection is overruled and Defendants’ Fee Application is granted in part as recommended by Magistrate Judge Varholak.

Stenson's claims in this case allege that, as a result of Edmonds’ negligent operation of the semi truck he was driving for Cargill, the semi truck and Stenson's vehicle collided, seriously injuring Stenson. In one of my previous orders in this case, I included the following description of the facts leading up to the filing of Defendants’ Fee Application:

Order Denying Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-3, ECF No. 91.

After Defendants filed their Fee Application, Stenson moved for reconsideration of my June 25, 2020 Order imposing sanctions on Stenson and awarding Defendants their reasonable expenses. I denied Stenson's Motion for Reconsideration and advised the parties that I would be referring Defendants’ Fee Application to Magistrate Judge Varholak for him to prepare a recommendation. Id. at 5-6. On March 8, 2021, Magistrate Judge Varholak issued his Recommendation, proposing that I grant Defendants’ Fee Application in part and award $82,580.26 in fees. Stenson filed his first Objection (ECF No. 116) to the Recommendation, in which he argued that Magistrate Judge Varholak should not have considered the prestige of the attorneys’ firm in evaluating the reasonableness of their hourly rates and should not have permitted rates of $300 and $325 per hour for paralegal work. Because Magistrate Judge Varholak had not explicitly addressed the reasonableness of the paralegal rates, I returned the matter for him to supplement his Recommendation. On March 26, 2021, he issued a Supplemental Recommendation, further justifying why the attorneys’ rates were reasonable but reducing the allowed paralegal rate to $125 such that the total recommended award is $81,113.78. Stenson has filed an Objection to the Supplemental Recommendation, again challenging the reasonableness of the attorney and paralegal rates.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), I must review de novo all portions of Magistrate Judge Varholak's Recommendation and Supplemental Recommendation to which Stenson specifically objects. “De novo” means I must consider the matters “as if [they] had not been heard before and as if no decision previously had been rendered.” 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3070.2 (3d ed. 2021).

As explained by Magistrate Judge Varholak in his Supplemental Recommendation:

Suppl. Recommendation at 5, ECF No. 118 (citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Varholak then reviewed the recent caselaw and determined that “courts in this district have awarded between $100 and $180 per hour for paralegal work in recent years.” Id. at 6. He considered the paralegal's qualifications and ultimately recommended reducing the paralegal rate to $125 per hour. Id. at 7. On top of that reduction, Magistrate Judge Varholak recommended applying a blanket deduction of 20% to all of the time entries, id. at 7, 8 n.8, concluding “the hours submitted are slightly inflated,” Recommendation at 9, ECF No. 114.

Stenson contends that the paralegal rate recommended is still “too high for the purely clerical or secretarial services performed by the paralegal in this case.” Obj. to Suppl. Recommendation at 1, ECF No. 120. He points to the following time entries:

Id. at 2. Stenson proposes that the rate for these services be further reduced to $75 per hour. Id.

As Magistrate Judge Varholak found, preparing exhibits and records is not merely a clerical exercise. Recommendation at 7. Those tasks require intimate familiarity with the case and the submission procedures. Such work demands a higher level of expertise than traditional clerical work, like calendaring dates, scanning, copying, printing, and filing. Thus, I agree with Magistrate Judge Varholak's determination that $125 per hour for the paralegal's services is reasonable and find that applying the additional 20% reduction removes any doubt as to the reasonableness of the fees.

In reaching his recommendation on the appropriate hourly rate for Defendants’ attorneys, Magistrate Judge Varholak considered: (1) his own experience in the Denver legal market, (2) the years of experience and skill level of Defendants’ attorneys, (3) the reputation of the attorneys’ firm—Faegre Drinker—in the community, (4) the size of the law firm, (5) the supporting affidavit submitted by Defendants, (6) the 2017 Colorado Bar Association Economics of Law Practice survey submitted by Stenson, (7) the attorneys’ customary rates, (8) the success achieved by Defendants in arguing the Motion for Sanctions, (9) my previous finding of reasonable fees in this matter, (10) the fact that the fees requested were actually paid by the client, and (11) the 12% fee reduction given to Defendants. Suppl. Recommendation at 3-4. Magistrate Judge Varholak's Supplemental Recommendation summarized his conclusions based on those considerations and addressed Stenson's initial objections to his Recommendation, stating:

Suppl. Recommendation at 4 n.3 (citations omitted).

Stenson advances three arguments for why Magistrate Judge Varholak's recommendations should not be followed. First, Stenson contends that the recommended rates should be reduced because they are not in line with the average rates in the Colorado Bar Association (“CBA”) 2017 Economic Survey. Second, he asserts that the case is not complex and that the work performed by the attorneys in discovering Stenson's fraud could have been performed by a paralegal. And, third, he insists it was inappropriate for Magistrate Judge Varholak to rely on the size of the attorneys’ law firm in assessing the reasonableness of their rates.

*4 Regarding the CBA Survey, Magistrate Judge Varholak explained that he, “like others in this District, is ‘dubious’ as to the ‘validity and overall value’ of the survey to the case at hand.” Recommendation at 11 (quoting Stroup, 2018 WL 10613861, at *7). In the context of this case, I am of the same mind. A reasonable rate for an attorney is “the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). The prevailing market rate is determined based on the rates “in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). The CBA Survey includes private and public attorneys from all over the state, with differing levels of experience and billing practices, specializing in nearly every area of law. Stenson argues that the attorneys’ rates should be reduced to $250 per hour, the median billing rate for attorneys in Denver. But that rate does not account for the specific attributes of Defendants’ attorneys, i.e., their comparable skill, experience, and reputation. As a result, it is unreliable for assessing the reasonableness of their rates.

As for Stenson's second argument, it matters not that the facts underlying his claims are straightforward; the complexity here was brought about by his conduct in this litigation. In my years on the bench, I do not remember a case in which a party personally committed fraud as blatantly as Stenson has.[1] The resulting quandary has required me, as well as the attorneys involved, to dedicate extensive resources to researching and contemplating the proper path forward. Moreover, the work performed by Defendants’ attorneys was not just in uncovering the fraud; it included skillfully presenting the culpable conduct and Defendants’ request for sanctions to the Court under unusual circumstances.

Lastly, I agree with Stenson that the size and prestige of the firm at which Defendants’ attorneys are employed should not alone dictate the reasonableness of their billing rates. Still those considerations are relevant for determining the prevailing market rate for the attorneys’ services. Specific clients may pay a higher rate for attorneys at firms that have a national or international presence or that have practice areas covering multiple aspects of their business. Clients may also find additional value in the shared knowledge and experience at larger firms. Significantly, Defendants paid the attorneys at their billed rates (with a 12% discount), which is a strong indicator of the prevailing market rate for the attorneys’ services. As Magistrate Judge Varholak found, I conclude that the requested rates for Defendants’ attorneys—between $382.80 and $466.40 per hour—are on the high end of rates charged in Denver for similar services but are nevertheless reasonable considering the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation.[2]

*5 After reviewing de novo the challenged portions of Magistrate Judge Varholak's Recommendation and his Supplemental Recommendation, I have determined his conclusions are well-reasoned and fair. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

DATED this 21st day of May, 2021.