*1 Pending before the court is Plaintiff Queen E. Riley's (“Riley”) Motion Compel (#41), wherein she seeks to compel Defendant Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. (“Dolgencorp”) to: (1) provide “truthful” answers to two interrogatories, (2) produce reports of similar slip and falls for the one-year period after Riley's injury, (3) produce the Director of Procurement to testify on two topics, and (4) produce the Director of Risk Management to testify on two topics. Having considered the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). “[D]iscovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil cases.” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); accord United States v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 4:12-CV-543, 2016 WL 278967, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2016). At the discovery stage, relevancy is broadly construed, and information is considered relevant if it “encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended,

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Therefore, in order for information to be discoverable, it “must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case—which are related but distinct requirements.” Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kim Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017). The burden to establish lack of relevance is on the party opposing a discovery request to “show specifically how each request is not relevant ....” Anderson Energy Grp. (Ohio), LLC v. Endeavor Ohio, LLC, No. 3:13-CV-1784-P-BK, 2014 WL 12580471, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2014) (citing Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 475, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). Moreover, “[t]he burden is on the party resisting discovery to establish the discovery is not proportional.” Hall v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:16cv978, 2018 WL 4293141, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018).

*2 “Counsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 730 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990)). A party may submit a motion to compel disclosure of discovery if “the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). Nevertheless, district courts have broad discretion in all discovery matters and should not “hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery process.” Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177; Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kelly v. Al Furat Petroleum Co., 531 U.S. 979 (2000); accord Bennett v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 890 F.3d 597, 603 (5th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that district courts have broad discretion on discovery issues).

In terms of the substance of discovery, “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(3). If a party objects to an interrogatory, that objection “must be stated with specificity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4). Additionally, requests for documents must describe with particularity each item to be inspected, and objections to requests must be specific and state if any documents “are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” FED. RS. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A), 34(b)(2)(B), (C). If a party fails to answer an interrogatory or to produce a document in compliance with these guidelines, the other party may move to compel an answer, designation, or production. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii-iv).

II. Interrogatories 14 and 15

Riley moves to compel answers to Interrogatories 14 and 15 which involve the floor mat upon which Riley allegedly slipped. Riley does not contend that Dolgencorp failed to answer the Interrogatories. Rather, Riley complains that she does not believe Dolgencorp has provided truthful answers in light of the fact that it has changed or supplemented its responses six times. Nevertheless, Riley has not produced any evidence showing that Dolgencorp's current answers are objectively false. Therefore, the court is unable to grant Riley a remedy. Accordingly, Riley's motion to compel answers to Interrogatories 14 and 15 is denied.

III. Request for Production 21

In Request for Production 21, Riley seeks all incident reports for trip and falls involving a floor mat in Dollar General stores in Texas from May 2015—two years before her accident—to May 2018—one year after her accident. Dolgencorp has produced responsive incident reports from the two-year period preceding the accident but contends the subsequent incidents must have occurred under substantially similar conditions for the reports to be discoverable. See Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 426 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of similar accidents occurring under substantially similar circumstances and involving substantially similar products may be probative.” (quoting Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1986))). The rule that requires similar incidents occur under substantially similar conditions is an evidentiary rule governing the evidence's admissibility at trial rather than its discoverability. See R.R. Mgt. Co., L.L.C. v. CFS La. Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Not all discoverable material is admissible.”); Yanez v. Turgeon, No. A-06-CA-897 LY, 2007 WL 9710183, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2007) (ordering the defendant to produce evidence of subsequent accidents). At the discovery stage, Dolgencorp has the burden of establishing that the request is irrelevant or not proportional. Dolgencorp has failed to satisfy its burden. Accordingly, Riley's motion to compel production of documents responsive to Request for Production 21 is GRANTED.

IV. Deposition of Corporate Representative

*3 On March 8, 2019, Riley served Dolgencorp a notice of deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). The notice designated 48 topics. Defendant produced Jesse Nunez (“Nunez”) as its corporate representative for several of the topics. Riley contends that Nunez was not prepared to testify on some of the topics for which he was designated. Particularly, Riley contends Nunez was not prepared to offer testimony as to the following: (1) topic 16, policies and procedures regarding the procurement of floor mats, (2) topic 47, the type of floor mats used in Dolgencorp's store on May 8, 2017, (3) topic 30, the job responsibilities of a senior claims' examiner, and (4) topic 31, Dolgencorp's efforts to respond to Riley's Discovery request.

Riley requests that the court compel Dolgencorp to produce the Director of Procurement to testify on topics 16 and 47 and to produce the Director of Risk Management to testify on topics 30 and 31. Dolgencorp has agreed to produce an unnamed corporate representative on topics 16 and 47 and Adam Zager, the Director of Risk Management, on topics 30 and 31. Dolgencorp has agreed to cover the expenses, except Riley's attorney's fees, incurred by these depositions. Riley contends that Dolgencorp's failure to designate the Director of Procurement and to cover her attorney's fees renders Dolgencorp's offer insufficient.

A. Director of Procurement

“Rule 30(b)(6) provides a mechanism for deposing a corporation.” Omega Hosp., LLC v. Community Ins. Co., 310 F.R.D. 319, 321 (E.D. La. 2015). The rule states:

Nothing in the rule indicates that the court has the authority to dictate which agent a corporation must designate on a specific topic. Rather, the rule leaves the determination of the identity of the representative a corporation will designate to the corporation's discretion. Moreover, the rules provide other mechanisms whereby Riley may notice the deposition of specific Dolgencorp employees. Therefore, in light of Dolgencorp's agreement to produce an adequately prepared corporate representative, the court declines to mandate that Dolgencorp designate its Director of Procurement in response to Riley's Rule 30(b)(6) notice.

B. Attorney's Fees

“The deponent has a duty to make a good-faith effort to designate a knowledgeable representative and to prepare the representative so he can fully, completely, and unevasively answer questions about all of the noticed topics.” Omega Hosp., LLC, 310 F.R.D. at 322 (citing Brazos River Auth., 469 F.3d at 433). “If that agent is not knowledgeable about relevant facts, and the principal has failed to designate an available, knowledgeable, and readily identifiable witness, then the appearance is, for all practical purposes, no appearance at all.” ADR Tr. Corp. v. S. Union Co., Inc., 985 F.2d 196, 197 (5th Cir. 1993); see Robinson v. Nexion Health at Terrell, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 438, 441 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Ferko v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 143 (E.D. Tex. 2003). Under those circumstances the court may impose sanctions; however, “[i]f there is a reasonable probability that a lesser sanction will have the desired effect, the court must try the less restrictive measure first.” Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3) (listing the available sanctions).

*4 Here, although Dolgencorp contends that it could contest whether Nunez was adequately prepared for his deposition, it has volunteered to produce additional witnesses on the topics in question and to cover the expenses of those depositions. Moreover, both parties bear some responsibility for the court's having to intervene in their discovery disputes. Accordingly, a sanction in the form of attorney's fees is not justified at this time. Therefore, to the extent Riley seeks relief beyond that to which Dolgencorp has agreed, the remainder of the motion is denied.

V. Conclusion

Consistent with the forgoing analysis, Riley's Motion to Compel (#41) is granted in part and denied in part.

SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 1st day of October, 2019.